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ATTACKING BY-LAWS: ZONING AND THE 
TRADITIONAL RULES (Part II)
By G. Keith Allenf 
CHAPTER 8 
U nreasonableness
A superintending power of a judicial character is necessary to be 
exercised in order to keep municipal bodies within legal and rea­
sonable limits in the exercise of the powers delegated to them by 
the Legislature. There has always been such a power where 
English law has prevailed; without it great oppression misht be 
exercised and great confusion created.
It is a description of control from which any Court to whom it is 
committed would rather be relieved.
In the nature of things, the Legislature could not exercise the 
control so as to meet the exigency of each particular case. It is 
for that and other reasons vested in the judiciary. And the judges 
must exercise it under the same sense of responsibility as they dis­
charge their other duties. . . The municipal powers are not only 
limited, but must be reasonably exercised, and not only strictly 
within the limits conferred by the Legislature, but in perfect sub­
ordination to the general law of the land.1
These comments adequately summarize the approach adopted 
by the courts in relation to by-laws enacted by municipalities dur­
ing the early days of their development. The remarks indicate the 
paternalistic attitude adopted by many of the Judges in relation to 
municipal institutions. It was felt that there must be some 
“superintending power” to pass on the merits of each ordinance.
Early judicial decisions concerning municipal enactments 
were affected to a considerable degree by English precedent. The 
English Courts were, and to a more limited extent still are, con­
cerned with the reasonableness of local by-laws. The Canadian 
Courts when adopting the English “reasonableness” rule, did not 
take cognizance of differences in the enabling legislation in the two 
countries. The English legislation was couched in very general 
language, akin to the “peace, order and good government” clause 
appearing in Canadian legislation. With legislation of this character, 
it was imperative that some body should scrutinize by-laws enacted 
thereunder.
The practise in Canadian legislation has been to enumerate 
specific areas in which councils could exercise their legislative func­
tions. The “peace, order and good government” clause was, and is,
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1 Harison, C.J. in In re Thomas Brodie and Town of Bowmanville 38 
U.C.Q.B. 580; Similar remarks are made by Robinson C.J. in In re 
Barclay and Township of Darlington 12 U.C.Q.B. 86, which was fol­
lowed in In re Greystock and Municipality of Otonabee 12 U.C.Q.B. 
458. These cases were further discussed in Terry v Township of Haldi- 
mand 15 U.C.Q.B. 380; Middleton J. in Rogers v Citv of Toronto 33 
O.L.R. 89, p. 92 reviews the historical approach to by-laws taken by 
the Courts, describing it as usurped jurisdiction”. The history is also 
reviewed in Slattery v Naylor 13 A.C. 446.
of little significance. With legislation of this description it is difficult 
to conceive how the assumption could be drawn that the Courts 
were to exercise any supervisory power over municipal govern­
ments. The Court’s function should only have been to confine 
municipalities within the terms of the enabling legislation.
Mr. Justice Riddell in Re Angus and Township of Widdifield* 
and Re McCracken and United Townships of Sherborne et aP 
pleaded for the acceptance of the view that municipal governments 
are legislative bodies, and should not be (when their enactments are 
under consideration) treated differently from superior govern­
ments.4 This view would appear to be correct in the Canadian 
municipal context.
The first real judicial move toward restraining the power of 
the Court to invalidate by-laws for unreasonableness came with 
the decision in Kruse v Johnson.5 The enabling legislation under 
which the impugned by-law was enacted was, in the English tra­
dition, of a very general nature. The by-law which was under attack 
was one that prohibited singing within fifty yards of a house, after 
complaint by a resident or request by a police officer. The defend­
ant continued with his religious meeting after having been request­
ed to stop. The case was heard before Lord Russell of Killowen
C.J. and Matthew J., who were unable to reach agreement. The 
Chief Justice then constituted a special Court before which the 
matter was reargued.
Lord Russell of Killowen C.J., in what has since proved to be 
a monumental decision, discussed unreasonableness and the general 
principles applicable to local government by-laws in these words:
They ought to be supported if possible. They ought to be, as has 
been said ‘benevolently’ interpreted, and credit ought to be given 
to those who have to administer them that they will be reasonably 
administered. The Courts of justice ought to be slow to condemn 
as invalid any by-law . . .  on the ground of supposed unreasonable­
ness. I do not mean to say that there may not be cases in which 
it would be the duty of the Court to condemn by-laws . . .  as in­
valid because unreasonable. But unreasonable in what sense? If 
for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal in their 
operation as between different classes, if they were manifestly un­
just; if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such oppressive or 
gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as 
could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men, the 
Courts may well say: ‘Parliament ne\er intended to give authority 
to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires.’ But
* 24 O.L.R. 318.
3 23 O.L.R. 81.
4 The question of the reasonableness or otherwise of a statute was discuss­
ed by Lord Halsbury L.C. in Cooke v Charles A. Vogeler Company 
[1901] A.C. 102, where he said, “But a Court of law has nothing to do 
with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a provision, except so 
far as it may help them in interpreting what the Legislature has said”. 
This rule was adopted in the case of municipal by-laws in Johnson and 
Stockdill v Grossman [1943] 2 W.W.R. 314.
0 [1898] 2 Q.B. 91, at p. 99.
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it is in this sense, and in this sense only, as I conceive that the 
question of unreasonableness can properly be regarded. A by-law 
is not unreasonable merely because particular judges may think 
that it goes further than is prudent or necessary or convenient, or 
because it is not accompanied by a qualification or an exception 
which some judges may think ought to be there. Surely it is not too 
much to say that in matters that directly and mainly concern the 
people of the county, who have the right to choose those whom 
they think best fitted to represent them in their local government 
bodies, such representatives may be trusted to understand their own 
requirements better than judges.6
The effect of the decision was to permit local governments, 
within the defined limits, to make a determination based on local 
standards and conditions, of what is or is not reasonable for their 
locality, without undue judicial interference.
The practicality of a change in approach by the Courts is 
very evident. With the development of municipal institutions into 
responsible legislative bodies, accountable to their electors, it 
would be unpardonable for the Courts to interfere with their legiti­
mate functions.
It was argued that the by-law was unreasonable and oppressive.
The matter seems to be one pre-eminently proper to be dealt with 
by the local authorities, who have the best means of ascertaining 
the wants of the local and the travelling public. If, in the result, 
the public should prove to be inconvenienced by the by-law, the 
council would, no doubt, amend the by-law in accordance with 
the public desire, but, if they should refuse to do so, the clcctors 
have the remedy in their own hands, and could choose others who 
would.7
6 These particular remarks have been accepted and applied in such cases 
as: Rex v Awad 11 M.P.R. 389; The Blue Funnel M otor Line Limited 
v City of Vancouver [1918] 3 W.W.R. 405; The King v Broad [1915]
A.C. 1110(P.C.); Clarke v Rural Municipality of Wawken [1930] I 
W.W.R. 319;Attorney-General v Hodgson [1922] 2 Ch. 429; Denning v 
Maher 106 L.T. 846; Re Crabbe and Swan River 23 Man. R. 14; Short 
v Poole Corporation (1926) 1 Ch. 66; White v Morley [1899] 2 Q.B. 34; 
Thomas v Sutlers [1900] 1 Ch. 10; Re Stewart and Town of St. M ary’s
34 O.L.R. 183; The same rules as to interpretation have been advanced 
in Walker v Stretton 12 T.L.R. 363; In In Re Bylaw No. 92, Town of 
Winnipeg Beach 30 Man. R. 192 Dennistoun J.A. adopts the judg­
ment in loto. He states that by-laws should, as indicated be benevolently 
interpreted “in so far as the health and general welfare of the com­
munity are concerned . . . “but” . . . strictly construed in so far as it 
derogates from private rights.” O’Halloran J.A., in his dissenting judg­
ment in Rex v Woods 73 C.C.C. 386 would restrict the benevolent 
interpretation principle to the peculiar situation dealt with in the Kruse 
Case. This suggestion is not supportable.
7 Maclaren J.A. in Re Karry and City of Chatham 21 O.L.R. 566 at p. 569. 
See also: Commonwealth v Fowler 28 S.W. Rep. 786; Snell and Town
of Bellville 30 U.C.Q.B. 81; Re Foster and Township of Raleigh 22 
O.L.R. 26. As was said by Riddell J. in In re Hassard and City of Tor­
onto 16 O.L.R. 500 at p. 514: “in our little republics, every alderman 
is responsible to his constituents who will deal with him. according to 
their good will and pleasure. The people must in the long run have 
their way, and it is no part of the duty of the Court to interfere with 
the policy of the people or meir representatives.”
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The Legislature intervened to terminate the Courts’ reign as 
overseers of the municipal conscience. If a council was acting in 
good faith within the confines of its jurisdiction, the Courts were 
precluded from considering the unreasonableness of the by-law.s
With the introduction of this provision it was arguable that 
discrimination as a ground of attack was also abolished. In 
Kruse v Johnson,° the definition of unreasonableness included dis­
crimination. Numerous judgments after the decision in that case, 
declared by-laws bad for unreasonableness because they were 
discriminatory.10 The simple answer to this argument was that the 
Legislature had not conferred any authority on councils to discrim­
inate.11
Prior to the statutory restriction against setting aside by-laws 
for unreasonableness, it was clearly accepted that if the by-law was 
strictly within the powers of the municipality, that is, being precise­
ly within the terms of the enabling legislation, the unreasonableness 
of it could not be a consideration. This was a question that had 
already been determined by the delegating Legislature, and hence 
was not open to review by the Courts.12
8 A section analogous to that first introduced now appears as s.242(2) of 
the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1960, c.249. That section provides: “A by-law 
passed by a council in the exercise of any of the powers conferred by 
and in accordance with this Act, and in good faith, shall not be open 
to question or be quashed, set aside or declared invalid, either wholly 
or partly, on account of the unreasonableness or supposed unreason­
ableness of its provisions or any of them. . .”
[1898] 2 Q.B. 91.
10 Attorney-General of Canada v Toronto 23 S.C.R. 514; Regina v Russell
1 B.C.R. 256: See also: Re Bunce and Town of Cohourg [1963] 2 O.R. 
343; In re Clay and City of Victoria 1 B.C.R. 300. The same approach 
is indicated in M on n e'I v Beauvais 42 S.C.R. 211, where Duff J., 
after stating that it had been argued that the by-law was unreasonable
said: “To establish this contention in any sense germane to the question 
of the validity of the by-law it was necessary that the respondents 
should make it appear that it was not passed in good faith in the ex­
ercise of the powers conferred by the Statute. . .”
11 In Rex Ex Re!. St. Jean v Knot I [1944] O.W.N. 432, the Court when 
confronted with this argument on an application to quash simply 
dismissed it on the basis that the statute does not permit a discrimina­
tory by-law. In Rex v Paulowich [1940] 1 W.W.R. 537, Some general 
comments are made on a section similar to s.242(2) of the Ontario 
Municipal Act, and their relation to this argument.
12 Re Davis and Village of Creemore 38 O.L.R. 240; Winnipeg Merchan­
disers Limited  v City of Winnipeg [1936] 3 W.W.R. 530; Hall v 
Commonwealth 41 S.W. Rep. 2; Re Boylan and City of Toronto 15 
O.R. 13 Stark v Schuster 14 Man. R. 672; In re Perley 30 Man. R. 444; 
Re Brown and City of Calgary 5 W.L.R. 576; Regina v Gravelle 10 
O.R. 735; Leitch v Town of Strathroy 53 O.L.R. 665; Rex v A wad  11 
M.P.R. 389; Simmons v Mailing Rural District Council 13 T.L.R. 447; 
Henderson Thriftway Petroleum Ltd. v Reeves 3 D.L.R. (2d) 507;
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What is the effect of the statutory provision? Unreasonableness 
as a consideration is only excluded if the council is acting in good 
faith and within its authority.13 The section, on a strict wording 
suggests that bad faith must first be established before the question 
of the reasonablenes of the enactment can be considered. If bad 
faith is clearly shown the by-law is clearly ultra vires. The proper 
approach is to examine the reasonableness or unreasonableness of 
the by-law to assist in determining whether or not council was 
acting in bad faith.14 Within the framework of the statutory pro­
vision, the importance of the unreasonableness rule will still be 
considerable, but only in an evidentiary sense.
There are numerous decisions that suggest if the results of 
the by-laws application to particular situations are harsh and un­
warranted, then the by-law is bad for unreasonableness.16 At first 
blush, this seems a plausible approach, particularly so when one 
considers that the statutory provision was aimed primarily at the 
review of municipal policy per se. On sober reflection it became 
difficult to accept this proposition. The courts must still, of neces­
sity, review the merits of the policy decision made by council. The 
effect of the by-law may be looked at in determining if there has 
been good faith on the part of council.
Pigeon v City of Montreal 17 S.C.R. 495. As said by Rose J. in Milloy
and Township of Onondaga 6 O.K. 573, "The enacting words of the 
by-law are not, wider than the statute, and I must not allow a lively 
imagination to place a limitation on the power of the municipality that 
the Legislature has not seen fit to impose.” See also: In re Edmonton 
By-law No. 1546 10W.W.R. (N.S.) 407, Re Karry and City of Chatham
20 O.L.R. 178.
18 See in this respect: Lacey v Village of Port Stanley (1968) 1 O. R. 36.
14 Re Howard and City of Toronto 61 O.L.R. 563; Re McCormick and 
Township of Toronto [1948] O.W.N. 425; In Hignell v City of Win­
nipeg [1933] 3 W.W.R. 193 contracts had been refused to particular 
companies because they were not union or closed shops. The court 
considered a section similar to s. 242 (2) of the Ontario Act. The 
conclusion was reached, that even although the act was “unfair, un­
reasonable and governed by partiality”, the section precluded any in­
tervention by the Courts. This would seem to be the type of situa­
tions where the unreasonableness of the by-law could be used to show 
bad faith in the council.
15 An examination of the following cases is indicative of this approach: 
Arlidge v Islington Borough Council 78 L.J.K.B. 553; In re Talbot 
and City of Peterborough 12 O.L.R. 358; Scott v Pilliner [1904] 2 K.
B. 855; Stiles v Galinski [1904] 1 K.B. 615; Attorney-General v 
Denby [1925] 1 Ch. 596; Repton School Governors v Repton Rural 
District Council [1918] 2 K.B. 133; Regina v Petersky 5 B.C.R. 549; 
The King v Broad [1915] A.C. 1110 (P C.): Strickland v Hays 118961 1 
Q.B. 209; A lty v Farrel [1896] 1 Q.B. 636; Heap v Rural Sanitary 
Authority of Burnley Union 12 Q.B.D 617; Kelly and City of Tor­
onto 23 U.C.Q.B. 426; Re Taylor and City of Winnipeg 11 Man. R. 
420. In Regina v Martin 21 O.A.R. 145, it was suggested that a reg­
ulation might be so unreasonable in its results that the Court would 
interfere.
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S.242(2) of the Ontario Municipal Act, 16 refers only to by­
laws enacted under the provisions of that statute. This being so, 
a zoning by-law enacted under the Planning Act17 would still be 
open to attack as being unreasonable. Assuming that a Court is 
relatively free to consider the reasonableness of such by-laws, 
what approach will be taken?
The authorities indicate that merely because a by-law 
as applied may impose a financial burden or cause inconvenience 
to those to whom it applies, this is not a result that would be 
considered unreasonable. 18
It is difficult to envisage a by-law any more unreasonable 
than that considered in Regina Auto Court v Regina (City)19. A 
parcel of land owned by the plaintiff was placed in a park zone. 
The effect was to prevent him from utilizing his land for any nor­
mal use. It also precluded, for all practical purposes, any possi­
bility of sale, and equally resulted in a depreciation in value of the 
property. The plaintiff took an action for damages which was dis­
missed.
Graham J. appeared to consider a zoning by-law as social 
legislation which should be upheld if at all possible.
Zoning by-laws are relatively new but I think it is necessary for 
any growing city to pass such a by-law in planning the future 
development of such city.
Mr. Justice Currie in Halifax v Wonnacott20 also had occas­
ion to consider a zoning by-law in the context of unreasonableness. 
After referring to the problem inherent in uncontrolled industrial 
development, he said at p. 505:
. . .  it is proper that municipal bodies should have such power as 
is proper and suitable so as to give homesteaders,. . .  such quiet 
and enjoyment in their surroundings, such opportunities for re­
laxation and recreation as is possible. Therefore, also, it is proper 
that the Courts should assist in the enforcement of all appropri­
ate measures which are designed for that purpose, and which 
are applicable to the particular cases before it. It may happen at 
times that some persons may be inconvenienced or financially
R.S.O. 1960 c. 249.
«  R.S.O. 1960 c. 296.
18 In re Nasmith and City of Toronto 2 O.R. 192; State v Freeman. 38 
N.H. 426; Rex v Shelly 24 W.L.R. 285; Re Maycock and City of 
Winnipeg 24 Man. R. 646.
1925 W.W.R. (N.S.) 167. 
i® 1925 W.W.R. (N.S.) 167.
20 [1951] 2 D.L.R. 488. A number of cases show a clear adoption of 
this approach, for example: Rex v McNeil [1925] 1 D.L.R. 227; 
Robert Hudson Construction Corporation Ltd. v Town of Acton
[1958] O.W.N. 165; Re Brigden and Village of Port Elgin [1934] O. 
W.N. 632; Rex v Low Chung 27 B.C.R. 469; The Bell Telephone 
Company v Town of Owen Sound 8 O.L.R. 74.
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affected by restrictive building laws but modem experience has 
shown that the disadvantages of these laws do not fall with such 
disproportionate weight as to make them unreasonable and un­
warranted.
It was pointed out in Nectow v City of Cambridge,21 that 
merely because the courts could see no discernible reason for 
zoning lines to be drawn as they were, this was no justification 
for interference.
It is evident that the Courts will not quash a zoning by-law 
for unreasonableness. It would only be in the exceptional case 
where policy decision would not be invalidated. The judges lack 
the expertise which is now so essential in the field of planning. 
This unquestionably is another reason why there will be no at­
tempt to invalidate zoning by-laws for unreasonableness. Any “ 
other conclusion would necessarily result in zoning by the judi­





By-laws Contrary to Public Interest
A determination of whether a by-law has been enacted con­
trary to public interest, requires a consideration of many of the 
same factors inherent in a discussion of unreasonableness. In sub­
stance, for a by-law to be invalidated on this ground, a Court 
must review the legislative policy of the council. The Court, and 
not council, in this situation would be deciding what constituted 
the public interest of the municipality.1
The early law in this area developed from the premise that 
municipal councils were trustees of their powers; any action that 
advanced the interest of an individual, as opposed to the public 
at large, should be restrained.2
The Courts have laid down certain criteria against which 
the public interest of a by-law can be examined. In In re Peck 
and the Town of Galt,3 Osier J. A. commented on the by-law 
there under review, in these words:
The by-law is also open on its face to another objection, viz., 
that it was not passed in the interests of the public, but for the 
benefit of a particular class or corporation. So manifestly is this 
the case that it provides not only that. .  .the church shall pay 
all the costs and expenses incurred by the defendants in pre­
paring and passing it, but also that it shall not go into operation 
until a bond has been furnished satisfactory to the Council, in­
demnifying them against all loss which may be incurred by rea­
son of passing it, etc. Such stipulations as these are not found 
in a by-law in which the public are concerned.
Mr. Justice Dysart in Wallace v Town of Dauphin4 suggest­
ed the following considerations to determine the question:
1 In Miller v Rural Municipality of Cliarleswood [1937] 3 W.W.R.
686, the Court considered the question of public interest involved in 
a by-law permitting fur farming in a defined area. The by-law was 
struck down because “there can be no public need for such a change.” 
The Court clearly was making a policy decision, as to the desirability 
of the change initiated by the by-law.
3 Mr. Justice Osier in In re Morton and The Corporation of The City
of St. Thomas, 6 O.A.R. 323, said: “Corporations are trustees of
their power for the general public, and when they prostitute them
for the benefit of one individual at the cost of another, the general
public not being interested, their action will be restrained by the 
Courts.”
8 46 U.C.Q.B. 211. The by-law in question permitted the sale of a 
portion of a public square to a church, on condition that the church 
corporation enter into a bond to idemnify the municipality against 
any loss resulting from the by-law and sale.
* [1932] 2 W.W.R. 405.
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In testing whether a by-law is passed in the public or private in­
terest, the primary moving force behind the by-law must be look­
ed at; and if that force emanate from a private source, and if 
that source is to save harmless or to reimburse the corporation 
in respect to all costs, and is to reap the primary direct benefit 
from the by-law, leaving to the public only secondary and in­
direct benefit we may quite safely conclude that the by-law is in 
private and not public interest.
Based on these decisions, it must first be determined 
whether the impugned by-law is one originated by council or pro­
moted by some private individual. If the enactment is promoted 
by an individual, it must then be determined whether the by-law 
will confer only an interest on the promoter to the exclusion of 
the public at large. In situations where the council has utilized 
its legislative powers to settle a dispute between individuals, the 
lack of public interest is evident.6 If council does not provide an 
opportunity for the opponents of a by-law to object, this will be 
evidence which can be considered in determining the public in­
terest.6
The inherent difficulty in applying the early decisions, is a 
determination of what constitutes public interest. It has been held 
that if the private interest advanced by the by-law was para­
mount, even if an insignificant benefit accrued to the 
public, the by-law should be invalidated.7 A similar proposition 
was placed before the Privy Council in United Buildings Corpor-
5 Cases such as: Hutchinson v Town of Sandwich 16 O.W.N. 114, 
Pells v Boswell et al 8 O.R. 680, and In re Knudsen and Town of 
St. Boniface 15 Man. R. 317 afford examples of council intervention 
in private disputes. In Hatton v City of Peterborough 16 O.W.N. 191 
the sole purpose of the by-law was to assist an institution physically 
located outside the municipality. The Court held that no public in­
terest of the residents of the City was being enhanced. The case of In 
re Vashon and the Corporation of Township of East Hawkesbury, 30 
U.C.C.P. 194 is an even more obvious example. There the promoter, 
who stood to gain from the passage of the by-law, was also a member of 
the council; it was his vote that assured its passing. In Esquimalt 
Water Works Company v Victoria 10 B.C.R. 193 the Court held 
that merely because a member of council would benefit from the 
closing of a road, the by-law should not be invalidated as being con­
trary to public interest. It must be shown that the benefit obtained 
was prejudicial to the public interest.
« See In re Bent [1940] 2 W.W.R. 697.
7 See: Re Weir and City of Calgary [1907] W.L.R. 45; Dennis v 
Hughes 8 U.C.Q.B. 444; See also the comments in Re Pelet and 
Township of Dover 1 O.W.R. 792 to the effect “ . . .  that corporate 
powers must not be exercised for the benefit of one or two indivi­
duals at the cost of others, not necessarily at the pecuniary cost, but 
must not be so exercised as to put many to unnecessary inconven­
ience for the manifest advantage ot one or iwo.”
ition Limited v Vancouver.8 This argument was summarily re­
jected.
But though the operation of a by-law benefits one or more per­
sons more than others, it does not follow that by enacting it a 
corporation must be taken to give any bonus, nor can a by-law 
be said to be outside of the power of the Council merely be­
cause steps taken in the public interest are accompanied by 
benefits specifically accruing to private persons. If no one could 
benefit from this by-law but H . . . ,  and the whole advantage 
to the public at large, or to other members of the public, was 
to be found in the consideration moving from H . . .  to the cor­
poration, the matter might be otherwise.
This decision confirms that it will no longer be sufficient to 
negative public interest merely by establishing that some individ­
uals, more than any other, benefited from the by-law. Some more 
positive and concrete evidence will be required to do so. It may 
even be necessary to establish conclusively that council has acted 
in bad faith.9 It is possible for public and private interest to co­
exist compatibly in the same by-law, provided the private interest 
is one that coincides with the public interest.10
In Wallace v Town of Dauphin,n  it was declared that the 
public interest required to support a by-law could not be secon­
dary. It followed that if the benefit that accrues to the public is 
merely ancillary to the primary objective of conferring a benefit 
on a private individual, the public interest essential to the validity 
of the by-law is not established.12 Applying this test, it is the di­
rect act accomplished by the by-law, such as the closing of the 
street, that must stand the scrutiny of the public interest test.1*
14 U.N.B. L A W  JOURNAL
8 11915] A.C. 345. Reference can also be made to:
Esquimalt Water Works Company v Victoria 10 B.C.R. 193; Upper 
Canada College v City of Toronto 55 S.C.R. 433; Napier v City of 
Winnipeg 67 Man. R. 322; Towers Marts and Properties Ltd. v City 
of St. Catharines 34 D.L.R. (2d) 547; Lacey v Village of Port Stanley 
[1968] 1 O.R. 36; In re Inglis and City of Toronto 9 O.L.R. 562; Re 
Central Burnaby Citizen and Ratepayers Association 6 D.L.R. (2d) 511. 
The decision in The Metropolitan Stores Limited v The City of 
Hamilton {1945] O.R. 590 is also informative on this point.
* This is clearly the implication to be drawn from the remarks made 
by Rose J. in Gilmore v Township of Westminster 64 O.L.R. 344. 
These remarks are undoubtly obiter, as the by-law was struck down 
on other grounds.
10 Hutchison v City of Westmount 49 S.C.R. 621 (Idington J.)
11 [19321 2 W W R. 405. See also: Re Loiselle and Town of Red Deer. 
(1907) 7 W.L.R. 42.
12 It was held in Re Edwards and The Town of Brampton (1933) O.W. 
N. 635 that a conveyance to an individual of a portion of a street
closed by by-law, which would result in increased construction or 
employment in the municipality was not sufficient to establish the
public interest.
™ Re Loiselle and Town of Red Deer (1907) 7 W.L.R. 42.
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This proposition is at variance with the decisions in Re Mills and 
City of Hamilton;u  Re McLean and Town of North Bay;16 The 
Metropolitan Stores Limited v Hamilton16 and Keily v City of 
Edmonton et a/.17
There is an evident parallel between the development of the 
law in the field of public interest with that relating to unreason- 
ableness.The same result has been achieved in both instances, in 
the former through judicial development, in the latter by statute. 
The effect of determining public interest or the unreasonableness 
of a by-law are not appreciably different. In each case, the Courts 
must scrutinize the policy motivating the enactment. As with un­
reasonableness, the Courts concluded that the determination of 
public interest was a question best left with the municipal council 
familiar with local conditions.
Chief Justice Meredith in Jones v The Township of Tucker- 
smith18 clearly stated the principle.
In my opinion what is or is not in the public interest, in a case 
such as this, is a matter to be determined by the judgment of 
the municipal council, and what it determines, if in reaching its 
conclusion the council act honestly and within the limits of its 
powers, is not, and ought not to be open to review by any Court.
Similarly Mr. Justice Estey in Kuchma v The Rural Muni­
cipality of Tache19 said:
Upon the question of public interest, courts have recognized that 
the municipal council familiar with local conditions, is in the 
best position of all parties to determine what is or is not in the 
public interest and have refused to interfere with its decision un­
less good and sufficient reason be established.
1« 9 O.W.R. 731.
«  7 O.W.R. 355.
1« [1945] O.R. 590.
17 [1931] 1 W.W.R. 365.
18 33 O.L.R. 634. This case ultimately came before the Supreme Court 
of Canada (reported in 45 O.L.R. 67). It was there held that the by­
law had not been enacted in the public interest. Anglin J. held the 
by-law bad for other reasons. N o direct criticism was made of the 
remarks of Meredith C.J.O., he apparently having failed to interpret 
the evidence properly.
19 [1945] S.C.R. 234. In Berman v Parker (1954) 348 U.S. 26 Mr. Jus­
tice Douglas, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, 
on a constitutional issue commented on public interest in these 
words: “Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legis­
lature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well- 
nigh conclusive.”
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It is now evident that the significance of the public interest 
rule is evidentiary. An examination of the public interest will be 
carried out only as a means of determining if the by-law has been 
enacted in good faith.20
The discussion on zoning and unreasonableness is equally 
relevant to any discussion of public interet and zoning.21
If the original rule applied by the Courts in determining 
public interest were applicable to zoning, many by-laws amend­
ing the general zoning by-law, would be bad. A review of any 
planning commission or council agenda would indicate that a con­
siderable number of the zoning amendments proposed originate 
with private individuals. It is equally true that no overriding 
public interest is clearly indicated.
In Re Waterous and City of Brantford, 22 Chief Justice 
Moss in considering a question of public interest said:
If it appeared that in the public interest there was a pressing 
need for the change, if in the view of those acting on behalf of 
the city there had arisen a condition of affairs prejudicial to the 
general public, calling for intervention and remedy, and if, act­
ing upon such considerations, and without reference to individuals 
or individual interests, it had been determined that the change 
must be made, the public interest should prevail and the applicant 
must submit.
If this test were to be applied to zoning amendment by­
laws, the public interest criteria could never be satisfied.
Development of the law in this area has been such that it is 
extremely unlikely that any zoning by-law will be struck down 
for a lack of public interest per se. 23 Public interest in the case 
of zoning by-laws is one which can only be determined by a muni­
cipal council fully conversant with local conditions.
2<i Re Mills and City of Hamilton 9 O.W.R. 731; Hurst v Township of 
Mersea [1931] O.R. 290; Napier v City of Winnipeg 67 Man. R. 322; 
Rex ex rel Lee v Town of Estevan et al (1951) 3 W.W.R. (N.S.) 513; 
Re Howard and City of Toronto 61 O.L.R. 563; Leitch v Town of 
Strathroy 53 O.L.R. 665; Keiley v City of Edmonton et al [1931] 1 W. 
W.R. 365.
21 Supra p. 117-118
22 4 O.W.R. 355. This was an appeal from the judgment of MacMahon 
J. (reported in (1903) 2 O.W.R. 897) quashing the by-law as not be­
ing in the public interest. Moss C.J.O. held that there was no public 
interest being furthered by the by-law, and therefore it could not be 
upheld.
28 Decisions such as Township of Scarborough v Bondi 18 D.L.R. (2d) 
161 and Re North York (Restricted Area) By-law 14,067 (1960) 24 
D.L.R. (2d) 12 indicate that merely because the by-law may deal only 




As mentioned in the discussion on unreasonableness,1 Lord 
Russell of Killowcn C. J. in Kruse v Johnson2 indicated that dis­
crimination in a by-law was a justification for declaring such by­
law unreasonable and therefore bad. From an integral part of the 
unreasonableness rule, discrimination in its own right has develop­
ed into an important ground of attack on by-laws.
A province can, within constitutional limitations, enact dis­
criminatory legislation; similarly, it may likewise delegate such 
power to a subordinated legislature. If a municipality exercises the 
authority so delegated, the by-law will not be subject to attack 
from discrimination.3
In Soon Hing v Crowley,4 Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the 
United States Supreme Court, indicated at p. 708 when a Court 
may properly consider the question of discrimination:
The specific regulations for one kind of business, which may be 
necessary for the protection of the public, can never be the just 
ground of complaint because like restrictions are not imposed 
upon other businesses of a different kind. The discriminations
wnich are open to objections are those where persons engaged 
in the same business are subjected to different restrictions 
or are held entitled to different privileges under the same 
conditions. It is only then that the discrimination can be said to 
impair that legal right which all can claim in the enforcement of 
the law.
Discrimination can best be discussed by examining three 
general areas where it is encountered: (1) situations where the 
by-law imposes different restrictions, duties, fees etc., within 
classes, e.g., as between residents and non-residents; (2) situations 
where the council lays down no rules at all, but reserves to itself 
a discretion to permit or refuse each application; and (3) situa­
tions where the council, or a municipal official, discriminates 
against violators of the by-laws in the manner of enforcement.
In Jonas v Gilbert,5 the Court was confronted with a by-law 
which purported to impose different liccnse fees as between resi­
1 Supra p. 111
2 [1898] 2 K.B. 91
8 Re Brown and City of Calgary 5 W.L.R. 576; Rex v 'Low Chung
27 B.C.R. 469; Re Neilson Engineering Ltd. v City of Toronto [1968]
I O.R. 271; In re Perley 30 Man. R. 444.
4 113 U.S. 703; See also: Barbier v Connolly 113 U.S. 27; R e x \ A wad
II M.P.R. 389.
0 5 S.C.R. 356; The principles laid down in this decision have been 
applied in: Rex v Paulowich [1940] 1 W.W.R. 537; Regina v Hoy 
38 D.L.R. (2d) 201; Regina v Pipe 1 O.R. 43; Murphy v The Queen
III C.C.C. 91; Rex v Pope (1906) 4 W.L.R. 278; Bateman v Mc­
Donald 8 M.P.R. 558; Rex v Pierce 30 D.L.R. 753.
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dents and non-residents carrying on business in the municipality. 
The enabling legislation merely gave power to license. The princi­
ples to be extracted from the judgment of Chief Justice Ritchie 
can be summarized as follows:
(1) The general power to tax by means of licenses involves the 
principles of equality and conformity, and confers no power to 
discriminate between residents and non-residents.
(2) A power to discriminate must be expressly authorized by law 
and cannot be inferred from general words.
(3) The intention of the legislature to confer the power of discrimina­
tion, must be expressly and distinctly declared in clear and 
unambiguous language.
These principles are not restricted to the type of legislation 
with which the Court was concerned, but are of general applica­
tion.
Discrimination on the face of a by-law is more prevalent in 
licensing by-laws or in by-laws imposing taxes. The situation in 
Attorney-General v Toronto0 affords an excellent example. A 
general discount on water rates was given by the City of Toronto 
to all consumers with the exception of the Government of Can­
ada. The enabling legislation was in general terms with no express 
power being given to differentiate between consumers in the im­
position of rates. The Chief Justice conceded that the Province 
had the power to delegate to the City the right to discriminate, but 
“ . . .  they would not be deemed to have intended to do so from 
a power to make by-laws expressed in general terms”.
As indicated in Soon Hing v Crowley,7 if authority is given 
to a municipality to regulate or impose restrictions on several
classes of business, it is not discriminatory to proceed against one 
of those classes to the exclusion of the others. There is no differ­
entiation in treatment —  one class is subject to regulation, the 
other is not. It is within the framework of the by-law regulating 
the particular business that some discriminatory provision must 
be apparent.
8 23 S.C.R. 514. In City of Hamilton v Hamilton Distillery Co. 38 S.
C.R. 239, the City of Hamilton undertook a similar program, the 
difference being that the higher water rates were imposed on the 
more profitable industrial concerns within the community. Mr. Justice 
Idington commented on the by-law in these words at p. 252: “In 
Hamilton they seem to apply the test of the relative profits, derivable 
from the different kinds of manufacturing business, or possibly the re­
lative moral character of each, or perchance the relative economic 
results from the point of view of the productions of general material 
wealth. None of these justify in law the clear discrimination that ex­
ists in the by-law.” The Court reiterated the principles stated in A t­
torney-General of Canada v Toronto, and concluded that the decision 
there given was conclusive against the by-law in this case..
1 113 U.S. 703
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A typical example is where a municipality is authorized to 
exempt classes of business from certain tax obligations. In Pirie 
and Town of Dundas8 the statute permitted tax exemptions to be 
given to specified classes of manufacturing businesses. The by-law 
under consideration exempted all new businesses of a certain type 
which met certain stated conditions. Wilson J., delivering the judg­
ment of the Court, exemplified the objection in these words:
The statute did not intend that every kind of manufacture should 
be exempted or that none of them should . . . .  But in no case is 
A of the cotton or any other particular trade, to get a benefit 
which B of the same trade is not to get also. For this is a mon­
opoly of the worst description, and it cannot be necessary either 
for the proper stimulus of trade, though it may stimulate A very 
wonderfully in that trade, but then only at the expense of B.9
The regulation of shop and service station hours has pro­
duced a myriad of decisions in which allegations of discrimina­
tion have been the predominant ground of attack. Many of the 
recent cases have resulted from local prejudice against what, for 
lack of a more apt classification, might be described as national or 
international retail establishments. This is particularly evident when 
attempts have been made to exempt from the operation of these 
by-laws tho small neighbourhood store, even though the larger 
retail outlets were selling, among other things, the same merchan­
dise.10
The introduction of criteria foreign to the statute to deter­
mine who must close or who is exempted is also objectionable 
on the principle that no expansion on the statutory requirements
is permissible as their introduction would have a discriminatory 
result.11
« 29 U.C.Q.B. 401.
!* ¡bid., p. 407. Moreover, O’Connor I. in The Peoples Milling Com­
pany and Council of M edford 10 O.R. 405 at p. 414 said: “In fact, by 
such exemption persons in a particular line of business who are not 
exempted from taxation are compelled to contribute to the advance­
ment of others in the same line, who are in competition with them­
selves.” In The Carleton Woolen Co. Ltd. v Town of Woodstock, 3 
N. B. Eq. 138, a tax exemption to “any company” establishing a 
woolen mill was held to be discriminatory; the manner of levying 
taxes may also have a result similar to this. Swift Canadian Co. Ltd. 
v City of St. Boniface 5 D.L.R. (2d) 439. See also City of Ottawa v 
Royal Trust Co. [1964] S.C.R. 526 where it was held that it was per­
missible for council to draw a distinction between residential and non- 
residential buildings.
10 Re Entice and Town of Coburg [1963] 2 O.R. 343; City of Calgary 
v S. S. Kresge Co. Ltd. 52 D.L.R. (2d) 617.
11 City of Dartmouth  v S. S. Kresge Co. Ltd. 58 D.L.R. (2d) 229; S. S. 
Kresge Co. Ltd. v City of Windsor 7 D.L.R. (2d) 708. The decision 
in City of Toronto v Elias Rogers Co. 31 O.L.R. 167 is informative 
on this point. See also: Rex ex rel. Thompson v Russelle 100 C.C.C. 
175.
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Under a power to regulate, govern and control, regulations 
against a particular class cannot be imposed which have as their 
primary objective the advancement or protection of another trade 
or individual.12 Such regulations are clearly discriminatory. It is 
no less objectionable to prohibit certain classes of the public from 
buying specified kinds of consumer goods, for example, liquor, 
fire works, etc.13
These are the basic principles against which a by-law must 
be examined, and the tests which must be satisfied for it to be up­
held. There are numerous decisions dealing with discriminatory 
by-laws,14 most of which merely reiterate and apply these gen­
eral principles.
A discriminatory situation also results where a council lays 
down no rules, but reserves to itself a discretion to grant or refuse 
any application for a license or permit.
The by-law under consideration in City of Verdun v Sun Oil 
Company Ltd ,16 affords an excellent example of this situation. 
The enabling legislation gave council authority to make by-laws 
for regulating the construction of buildings. The by-law as enact­
ed required the applicant to submit in writing his request for a 
permit. The building inspector was then required to examine the 
plans and certify to council whether or not they met the building 
requirements. The council retained the right to grant or refuse the 
permit notwithstanding that there may have been full compliance 
with all regulations. The remarks of Mr. Justice Fauteaux in the 
Supreme Court of Canada may be paraphrased as follows:
The Council did nothing but leave to its discretion what it was 
authorized by the legislature to do by by-law. The action taken 
by the City effectively transformed its delegated authority to reg­
ulate by legislation into a mere administrative and discretionary 
power to grant or cancel by resolution the permit provided for 
in the by-law. Once exercised, the delegated right to regulate in 
the matters mentioned in the Act is to be maintained at the leg­
islative level and not to be brought down exclusively within the 
administrative field.
12 Regina v Johnston 38 U.C.Q.B. 549; City of Toronto v Virgo [1896]
A.C. 88; Re Howard and Village of Swansea [1947] O.W.N. 715.
18 Re T.W. Hand Fireworks Co. Ltd. and City of Peterborough 34 D.L. 
R. (2d) 102; Regina v Levy 30 O.R. 403. A laudatory purpose does 
not enhance the position of the by-law.
14 Some of these to which reference may be had are: Re West Vancou­
ver Service Station Closing 120 C.C.C. 294; Rex v Robinson 94 C.
C.C. 110; Re Henry’s Drive-In Ltd. & Hamilton Police Bd. [1960] O. 
W.N. 468; In re Campbell and City of Kingston 14 U.C.C.P. 285; 
Roberts v Climie 46 U.C.Q.B. 264; In re Clay and City of Victoria 
(1886) B.C.R. 300; Regina v Florey 17 O.R. 715.
15 [1952] 1 S.C.R. 222; See also: Re Martin and Fort Gary R.M. 19 D.
L.R. (2d) 578.
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If the statute conferring the authority requires that such 
powers must be exercised by by-law, this means the enacted by­
law must set forth general standards applicable to all in similar 
classes. The by-law in this case was not dicriminatory in it terms, 
but permitted unequal treatment in its administration. Neither is it, 
as said by Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. in Walker v Stretton,Ui 
“so free from doubt that ‘he who runs may read’
The classic definition of discrimination is that given by Mid' 
dleton J. in Forst v City of Toronto:17
When the municipality is given the right to regulate. . .  all it can 
do is pass general regulations affecting all who come within the 
ambit of municipal legislation. It cannot itself discriminate, and 
give permission to one and refuse it to another; and a fortiori, it 
cannot give municipal officers the right, which it does not pos­
sess, to exercise a discretion and ascertain whether as a matter 
of policy permission should be granted in one case and refused 
in another.18
The good intentions of the council in this situation are ir­
relevant, nor does it matter if they always act with propriety in 
exercising the discretion they have reserved to themselves. It is the 
potential of discriminatory conduct that is condemned.18
Any by-law which retains a discretion in the council, unless 
specifically authorized by statute, will be summarily struck 
down.20 The most emphatic statement on this point is that made 
by Mr. Justice Wright in City of Toronto v Mandelbaum:-V
18 12 T.L.R. 363.
17 54 O.L.R. 256 at 278.
18 Attempts to pursue this course of conduct on the part of council was 
considered in: Rex ex rei Falls v Shamrock Fuel Company [1924] 3 
W.W.R. 454; Re Imperial Oil Limited and The City of Kingston 
[1955] O.W.N. 767; As stated by Middleton J. in Cridland v City of 
Toronto 48 O.L.R. 266 at 267, “The council has power to pass laws 
binding on all those who are subject to its jurisdiction, but an attempt 
to regulate the conduct of any individual rather than to pass a gen­
eral law is bad.” In Ennis v Rural District of Placentia 24 M.P.R. 
429 at 432 Dunfield J. said: “The general idea is that municipal legis­
lative powers should be exercised mainly by general regulation ap­
plicable to everybody, and not by ad hoc decisions.” The principles 
were also considered in Regina v Moncton Building Inspector 44 D. 
L.R. (2d) 300; Bullock v Scarborough Township 19 D.L.R. (2d) 680:
B.C. Electric Co. Ltd. v District of Surrey 1 D.L.R. (2d) 717; Re Ross 
and Board of Commissioners of Police of Toronto [1953] 3 D.L.R. 
597; Regina ex rei Cox v Thomson 9 D.L.R. (2d) 107; Re Taylor and 
the City of Winnipeg 11 Man. R. 420.
19 Re Nash and McCracken 33 U.C.Q.B. 181. This decision was applied 
in: Regina v Webster 16 O.R. 187.
20 See: Regina v Jim Sing 4 B.C.R. 338; Town of St. Leonard v‘ Four­
nier 3 D.L.R. (2d) 315.
21 [1932] O.R. 552 at 556.
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. . .  but when it purports to say that a permit may be issued at 
the discretion of council, it at once becomes discriminatory in its 
operation, and therefore invalid.
Decisions such as Quincey v Kennard,22 Goldsmith v 
City of Indianapolists and Fischer v St. Louis2*, indicate that the 
American Courts are not as concerned as their Canadian counter­
parts with the discrimination inherent in the arbitrary dispensing
of permits. Brown J. in the latter case, speaking for the Supreme 
Court of the United States, said at p. 371:
We have no criticism to make of the principle of granting a 
license to one and denying it to another, and are bound to as­
sume that the discrimination is made in the interest of the public, 
and upon conditions applying to the health and comfort of the 
neighbourhood.
Ingenuity is not the sole prerogative of those in the field of tax­
ation. Councils having been rebuffed in attempts to retain direct 
control over permits and licenses have sought, with some success, 
to circumvent these restrictions.
In Re Cosentino and City of Toronto25 and Re Joy Oil Co. 
& Gillies & Toronto26 a system of licensing under a by-law that 
was general in application and regular in form was implemented. 
Despite evidence of the existing administrative practice of dis­
crimination in the granting of the permits the Courts in both cases 
refused an application for mandamus. To grant the relief sought 
would be an unwarranted interference with the Council’s discre­
tion to administer its by-laws. There being no discrimination ap­
parent on the face of the by-law itself, interference was not justi­
fied.27
The third area where discrimination is most apparent is where 
the council, or a municipal official, discriminates in the enforce­
ment of a by-law. In this situation evidence is usually led to es­
tablish that persons other than the defendant who are equally cul­
pable are permitted to violate the by-law with impunity.
22 24 N.E. Rep 860.
23 196 N.E. Rep 525.
2< 194 U.S. 361.
25 [1934] O.W.N. 715.
2« 67C .C.C . 325.
27 See A pet Auto Supply Co. v City of Hamilton 28 O.W.N. 265. Re­
gina v Scarborough, Ex parte Blue Sky Const. Co. [1960] O.W.N. 
535 is a further example of this type of situation. Council had auth­
ority to limit the number of service stations within the municipality. 
When an application was made for a permit to construct a service 
station, a determination was first made as to whether that particular 
applicant should receive it. If it was decided not to issue the permit, 
the by-law limiting the number of service stations was invalid, and 
the application denied. If the opposite decision was made, the by-law 
was amended and the application granted. The Court refused to grant 
a mandamus to compel the issuance of a permit. To have done so 
would have required council “to breach one of its valid by-laws”.
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In Re Joy Oil Co. & Gillies & Toronto?* McTague J. sug­
gested that the courts might grant relief if it could be established 
that a by-law, though correct in form, was systematically adminis­
tered so as to permit the exercise of discretion in the granting of 
permits. He did not offer any suggestions as to the form of the 
relief which might be given.
A most interesting decision, that of City of Toronto v Polaf29 
has recently been given by Mr. Justice Haines in the Ontario High 
Court. An application was made by the City for an injunction to 
restrain a high density use in a single family residential zone. It 
was established in evidence that the City maintained a “preferred 
list” of properties which were immune from prosecution, some of 
which were in the same area as the defendant’s property. Because 
of this obnoxious practice the defendant opposed the granting of 
of the equitable remedy of injunction. Mr. Justice Haines at p. 
660, agreed:
If the injunction had been granted two conditions would have 
been imposed: (1) the discontinuance of the preferred list prac­
tice; and (2) a sufficient time alloted for the defendant to sell her 
property.
With the morality of the decision there can be no question; 
for its legality there can be no support.30
An appeal was taken from this judgment to the Ontario Court 
of Appeal, and the judgment thereon has receently been given.31 
The three members of the Court of Appeal agreed in allowing the 
appeal.
Mr. Justice Schroeder, discussing the refusal of the lower 
Court to grant the injunction requested by the City said, at p. 492:
28 67 C.C.C. 325.
2» [1969] 1 O.R. 655.
An injunction is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. To 
obtain an injunction a plaintiff must come to Court with clean 
hands. He who seeks equity must do equity. In my opinion the 
plaintiff has acted inequitably by maintaining the ‘de­
ferred list’. The practice is secretive, it is not made known to all 
who might wish to avail themselves of it by the plaintiff. It is 
open to political abuse and law enforcement is thereby tainted 
with potential political favouritism. It permits the continuance of 
a prohibited use of one premises while prohibiting it in the im­
mediate neighbourhood. As I said previously the practice consti­
tutes de facto licensing and amendment by the Committee of the 
zoning by-law in individual cases. To grant the city an injunction 
in this case would be to sanction that practice.
80 In Re Rex v Roulet [1937] O.R. 912, it was argued that because of 
discrimination in the enforcement of the by-law the action should be 
dismissed. This argument was summarily dismissed.
»1 [1970] 1 O.R. 483.
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If then, the Court has no power to control directly the exercise 
of Council’s discretion in the manner of administration of the 
by-law under review, can it do so indirectly by refusing to grant 
injunctive relief to the City except upon the condition that it 
exercise its powers in a manner agreeable to the Court’s view.
To ask this question is to answer it.
All members of the Court agreed that although the practice 
of the City was discriminatory, there was an overriding public in­
terest in the enforcement of the by-law that must be acceded to, 
and therefore the injunction was granted.
There was also agreement that there may be situations 
where the equitable remedy should not be granted. If, for exam­
ple, the “administration of a by-law were tainted with corrup­
tion or where it was being enforced against only a discriminated 
few”, the Court should not assist in the perpetuation of that prac­
tice.
A zoning by-law is discriminatory in nature. In Forst v City 
of Toronto32 a discriminatory by-law was, by implication, defined 
as being one not general in nature and which affected those 
subject to it in an unequal manner. Chief Justice Strong in Attor- 
ney-General of Canada v Toronto33 suggested that municipal by­
laws must be uniform in their application throughout the munici­
pality.34
Although a by-law must be general in nature, it will not be 
discriminatory because its provisions may weigh more heavily on 
one person than on another.35
The leading decision relating to discrimination in zoning by­
laws is that of Township of Scarborough v Bondi.3C The applic­
able by-law restricted the construction of residential dwellings to 
one for each one hundred feet of street frontage. The lot, of 
which Bondi’s formed a part, was a triangular one having a front­
age on two streets and was sufficient to permit the construction
32 54 O.L.R. 256.
33 23 S.C.R. 514.
34 These remarks were explained by Newcombe J. in City of Halifax v 
Read [1928] S.C.R. 605 at 612. “The Chief Justice did not mean to 
include anything new as essential to the validity of a by-law. What he 
regarded as a requisite or an essential was uniformity, not in the 
sense of precise arithmetical equality, but as excluding arbitrary or 
unjust discrimination.”
35 See: Hall v Commonwealth 41 S.W. Rep. 2: Kiely  v City of Edmon­
ton [1931] 1 W.W.R. 365; Regina v Southern Garage (1959) Ltd. 39 
D.L.R (2d) 408; United Buildings Corporation Lim ited  v Vancouver 
[1915] A.C. 345; Hirsch v Town of Winnipeg Beach 26 D.L.R. (2d) 
659; Reeve v City of Fort William [1955] O.W.N. 207. Re Daines 
and City of Toronto 49 O.L.R. 285; Lacey v Village of Port Stanley
(1968) 1 O.R. 36.
30 18 D.L.R. (2d) 161.
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of four houses. Bondi owning one-half of the original lot was 
therefore entitled to construct two houses. The by-law was amend­
ed to prohibit the building of more than one dwelling on the lot 
owned by Bondi. The approval of the Municipal Board was re­
quested and obtained. The Supreme Court quashed the by-law on 
a technicality relating to the approval of the by-law by the Muni­
cipal Board. Mr. Justice Judson agreed that the approval had not 
been properly obtained, but he also dealt with zoning by-laws and 
discrimination in general.
Mr. Justice Judson, after referring to Forst v City of Tor­
onto37, said at p. 166:
Although I have a firm opinion that the original and amending 
by-laws do not infringe this principle, I share the doubt expressed 
by the learned Chief Justice whether it can ever afford a guide 
in dealing with a restrictive or zoning by-law. The mere delimita­
tion of the boundaries of the area affected by such a by-law in­
volves an element of discrimination. On one side of an arbitrary 
line an owner may be prevented from doing something with his 
property which another owner, on the other side of the line, with 
a property which corresponds in all respects except location, is 
free to do. Moreover, within the area itself, mathematical iden­
tity of conditions does not always exist. All lots are not neces­
sarily of the same frontage or depth. The configeration of the 
land and the shape of the lots may vary. Some lots may have 
frontages on two streets. These are only some of the consider­
ations which may justify a municipality in enacting these by-laws 
in exercising a certain amount of discretion.^8
The learned Judge commented on the specific question in 
these words at p. 165:
I do not think that one can characterize this by-law as discrim­
inatory merely because it points to one particular person or lot.
The task of the municipality in enacting the original by-law was 
to impose building restriction over a fairly wide area . . .  The in­
tent and effect of the amending by-law are clear-to compel the 
respondent to fall in with the general standards of the neighbour­
hood and prevent him from taking advantage of the district amen­
ities, the creation of the by-law to the detriment of other owners.
Far from being discriminatory, the amending by-law is nothing 
more than an attempt to enforce conformity with the standards 
established by the original by-law and which have been observed 
by all owners in the subdivision with this one exception.
It is doubtful if this decision can be interpreted as conferring 
a general authority on a municipal council to undertake a pro­
gram of spot rezoning. It really extends only to a situation where 
the amending by-law seeks to bring the land to which it relates 
into conformity with the standards existing in the neighbourhood.
37 54 O.L.R. 256.
®8 These views are not at all novel, in fact similar comments were 
made by Plaxton J. in The City of Niagara Falls v Mannette 
[1943] O.W.N. 599; See also: Halifax v Wonnacott (1951) 2 D.L.R. 
488; Re Maycook and City of Winnipeg 24 Man. R. 646.
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The decision was applied in this manner in Re Dillabough et al 
and Township of Esquimalt.8ft A general zoning by-law applied to 
an area in which there existed two non-conforming uses. The a- 
mending by-law related only to one of those lots, having been 
passed to prevent a development on that specific lot. Mr. Justice 
Ruttan concluded that the by-law was discriminatory, and would 
only come within the Bondi rule if both lots were included. In the 
action taken it was held that the council was not acting in the in­
terests of the whole area and that they were being inconsistent and 
showing favouritism. The decision can be supported on the 
ground that the council was not acting in good faith.40
Mr. Justice Kelly in Re Mississauga Golf and Country Club 
Ltd.41 has given the Bondi rule a very broad interpretation. The 
Court was there concerned with the rezoning of a lot for a ser­
vice station use. The land in question had been put in a special 
zone established only for that property. His Lordship commented 
on the Bondi Case as follows at p. 679:
In the light of the decision in Township of Scarborough v Bondi 
. . .  the mere fact that conditions otherwise appropriate were 
applicable only to a certain parcel of land can no longer be 
grounds for disallowing such a by-law as invalid. The test laid 
down in that case clearly envisages that the application in good 
faith to some lands only of special conditions not generally ap­
plicable would not necessarily result in a departure from the 
proper principles so as to require that the by-law be declared in­
valid.42
The effect of these decisions is to remove a zoning by-law 
from the normal application of the rule against discrimination. 
Similarly, no objection will be raised if special conditions are at­
tached which are applicable only to that property, provided such 
conditions may be validly imposed by the council within the terms 
of a zoning by-law.
It is clear that council cannot place any restrictions on a 
property within a general zone, which conditions are not appli­
cable to all other properties.43 The only manner in which this can 
be achieved is the creation of a separate zone for the property to 
which the conditions are to apply.
»9 62 D.L.R. (2d) 653.
40 Mr. Justice Judson found in the Bondi Case that the Council had been 
acting in good faith. This aspect of the Bondi Case was considered 
in Re Cohen and City of Calgary 64 D.L.R. (2d) 238.
41 (1963) 40 D.L.R. (2d) 673.
42 It was also held in Re North York By-law 14067 (1960) 24 D.L.R. 
(2d) 12 that council could rezone one lot, and that the question of 
ownership of that lot was not a relevant factor for the Ontario Muni­
cipal Board to consider in deciding whether to approve the by-law.
48 Re Rosling and City of Nelson 64 D.L.R. (2d) 82, See also: City of 
Toronto v Solsway (1919) 49 D.L.R. 473.
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Discrimination as a ground of attack on zoning by-laws will 
not be particularly significant in the normal zoning situation. It 
can only be used as a means of proving the bad faith of the coun­
cil in enacting it.
The significant result of these recent decisions is that a muni­
cipality may be better able to control development within its 
boundaries by the use of zoning. This can be done by the crea­
tion of special zones and the implementation of special conditions 
applicable thereto.
This type of approach would be applicable to a system of 
planned unit development.44 It is difficult to bring this type of de­
velopment within the existing framework of the accepted rule 
against discrimination. Traditionally it has been felt desirable to 
specify in the by-law all of the conditions that any development 
must meet to be permitted. The system of planned unit develop­
ment requires the preparation of special conditions applicable only 
to the one project. It involves discrimination in the sense that all 
developments of a similar type may not necessarily be treated 
equally.
The dec'sion in Rr North York Rv-1aw 14067, 45 and in Re 
Mississauga Golf and Country Club Ltd. 46 may well be applied 
to enable a municipality to pursue a program of planned unit de­
velopment.
For a more detailed consideration of this topic, reference may be
made to: Krasnowieski, Jan, Legal Aspects of Planned Unit Resi­
dential Development, A Study, Urban Land Institute Technical Bul­
letin # 5 2 , 11; Babcock, Richard F., An Introduction to the Model 
Enabling A ct for Planned Residential Development, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (1965-66) Vol. 114 p. 136.
«  (1960) 24 D.L.R. (2d) 12.




An essential criteria against which any by-law must be mea­
sured is certainty. In some of the early decisions dealing with ap­
plications to quash, the Courts did not appear to consider this ob­
jection serious enough to warrant intervention. Draper C. J., in 
In re Smith and City of Toronto, said:
I am not disposed to give the slightest countenance to motions 
to quash by-laws on any ground such as a want of clearness of 
expression or a difficulty in construing or applying its provisions.
If it be impossible to apply its provisions, they will remain un­
applied; if they are uncertain, there may be difficulty in constru­
ing and acting upon them.1
Uncertainty was therefore not considered an illegality within 
the meaning of the statutory provision permitting applications to 
quash. The result of these decisions was to require the matter to 
be litigated in another forum.
In Re Elliott2 it was suggested that if a by-law was uncertain 
or unintelligible then it could not be determined whether it was 
illegal or not. Illegality being the only ground upon which a by­
law could be quashed, an application could not be granted; the 
by-law was merely unenforceable. The better view is that if the 
by-law is properly put before the Court and is judicially determin­
ed to be uncertain, it must be struck down.3
If a by-law has been drafted in strict accordance with the 
enabling legislation, it probably cannot be held to be uncertain. 
This is assuming that the words of the statute are utilized.4
The basic rule on uncertainty is that stated by Anglin J. in 
The City of Montreal v Morgan.5
I fully recognize the force of the general rule that the language 
of by-laws should be explicit and free from ambiguity, and that 
by-laws in restraint of rights of property as well as penal by-laws 
should be strictly construed.6 But the very statement of the latter 
rule implies that a by-law is not necessarily invalid because its 
terms call for construction— as does also another well recognized 
rule, viz., that a by-law of a public representative body clothed 
with ample authority should be “benevolently” interpreted and
1 10 U.C.C.P. 225; Hodgson v Municipal Council of York and Peel
13 U.C.Q.B. 268, Robinson C. J. refused to quash a by-law for 
uncertainty, in view of the time which had elapsed before the 
making of the application.
2 11 Man. R. 358.
8 Clarke v Rural Municipality of Wawken (1930) 1 W.W.R. 319.
4 Winnipeg Merchandisers Limited v City of Winnipeg (1963) 3 W.W.R. 
530.
# 60 S.C.R. 393.
6 Regina v Jim Sing 4 B.C.R. 338.
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supported if possible. . .  It would be going quite too far to say 
that merely because a term used in a by-law may be susceptible 
of more than one interpretation the by-law is necessarily bad 
for uncertainty.7
The Court must first attempt to ascertain the purpose of the 
by-law. Mere difficulty in determining its purpose is not sufficient 
reason to strike it down. The language must be relatively clear 
and at least capable of some interpretation. The Courts should 
not be astute to find reasons for striking down municipal enact­
ments;8 an effort should at least be made to support them. If such 
an approach were not taken, many by-laws of rural municipalities 
would be invalid. The same degree of precision expected in Pro­
vincial and Federal legislation is not usually attainable in smaller 
municipalities.
The two considerations that should be borne in mind by the 
Courts are perhaps best enunciated in Walker v Stretton, “ a de­
cision by Lord Russell of Killowan C. J.:
It was also safe to lay down this general proposition— that, al­
though it was desirable that by-laws should be so free from doubt 
that “he who runs may read’10 yet as even in the case of higher 
legislative bodies this was not always attained, the Court should 
strive to so construe this by-law as to give reasonable effect to 
the object aimed at.
The essential criteria seems to be reasonable clarity. 11 If 
this is achieved, barring other difficulties, the by-law will be up­
7 Despite the statement in The City of Montreal v Morgan, 60 S.C.R. 
393 that merely because a word used in a by-law may be capable of 
having more than one meaning it is not thereby uncertain, the Courts 
have not been adverse to striking down by-laws for the use of very 
vague or general words, for example words such as: small (Re Bunce 
and Town of Cobourg (1963)2 O.R. 343, but see Re Harris and City 
of Hamilton 44 U.C.Q.B. 641); normal business hours, (Marilyn In­
vestments Ltd. v Rural Municipality of Assiniboia 51 D.L.R. (2d) 
711); principal business, (City of Dartmouth v S. S. Kresge Co. Ltd. 
58 D.L.R. (2d) 229;) the description of an area as being “the public 
streets adjacent to a market”, has also been held bad (Re Harris and 
City of Hamilton 44 U.C.Q.B. 641); “Sabbath” has been held not 
uncertain, (Re Cribbin and City of Toronto 21 O.R. 325.)
8 Kruse v Johnson (1898) 2 Q.B. 91; Re Goldstein and City of Windsor
35 O.W.N. 9.
» 12 T.L.R. 363.
10 In Scott v Pilliner (1904) 2 K.B. 855, Lord Alverstone C. J. at p. 858, 
felt such enactments “should be clear and definite and free from 
ambiguity.” In Crowe v Steeper and Williams 46 U.C.Q.B. 87, Hag- 
arty C. J. was of opinion that “the language must be reasonable, clear 
and unequivocal.”
11 Blue Haven M otel Ltd. v District of Burnby 52 D.L.R. (2d) 464; In 
re Bent [1940] 2 W.W.R. 697; Nash v Finlay 85 L.T. 682; Regina 
v Jacobson 6 D.L.R. (2d) 758. An interesting interpretation of a by­
law that was quite uncertain in one of its provisions was made in 
Leyton Urban District Council v Chew  [1907], 2 K.B. 283.
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held. The fundamental prerequisite is that some indication must 
be given to those who are to be bound by it of the course of ac­
tion they may or may not pursue.12 It has been suggested that only 
when it is impossible to ascribe any meaning whatever to the by­
law can it be held uncertain.13
The effectiveness of the by-law cannot depend on any un­
certain event.14 It must be possible to know by studying the pro­
visions of the enactment when and under what circumstances it 
will be applicable.
It is quite conceivable that a by-law may be regular on its 
face, but still be bad for uncertainty. There may be some situa­
tions where an examination of the effect of the by-law will clearly 
indicate an uncertainty. In some situations it is only by conjuring 
up extreme examples that the problems become clearly visible. In 
other cases a particular factual situation may point up the dif­
ficulty apparent in giving the by-law universal application.15 Sim­
ilarly, if the effect of the by-law will or must depend on the stan­
dards of the individual determining whether or not there has been 
a violation of its provisions, the type of situation to which it will 
apply is thereby rendered so uncertain that the by-law is unen­
forceable.16
It can be argued that if the Courts undertake a determina­
tion of the effects of a by-law it may make the task of drafting 
valid by-laws exceedingly difficult. This would also necessitate un­
warranted speculation by the Courts. Despite this argument, there 
is authority for saying that if the effect of the by-law, when ap­
plied, is uncertain, it will not be upheld.17
Accepting the principle that the Court should make every ef­
fort to interpret a by-law so as to give it life and vitality, it should 
be equally careful not to judicially redraft the by-law to do so.
12 Leach v City of Regina 50 W.W.R. 129; Kruse v Johnston (1898) 2 
Q.B. 91. A greater degree of clarity will probably be required if the 
by-law is confiscatory.
18 See for example: St. Catharines v Hulse [1936] 2 D.L.R. 453; Blue 
Haven M otel Ltd. v District of Burnaby 52 D.L.R. (2d) 464; Esqui­
mau Water Works Company v The Corporation of the City of Vic­
toria 10 B.C.R. 193.
14 Re Cloutier 11 Man. R. 220; Wallace v Town of Dauphin [1932] 2 
W.W.R. 405.
15 Attorney-General v Denby [1925] 1 Ch. 596.
16 Rex ex rel McCorquodale v Wong [1937] 1 W.W.R. 552.
17 In re Clark and The Municipality of the Township of Howard, (1885)
9 O.R. 576.
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It is one thing to say that it is the duty of the Court to interpret 
a by-law notwithstanding difficulties that are presented by the 
language employed in the framing of the by-law once the inten­
tion of the enacting body is clear, but it is quite another thing to 
say that the Court is at liberty to conjecture and surmise as to 
the intention of the enacting body and then form a new enact­
ment to carry out the supposed intention either by adding to or 
subtracting from the enactment that is before the Court.18
Even where the intention of the by-law is clear, but the 
wording is not, the Courts must resist any temptation to alter it.19 
The result of implying words that are obviously omitted, is to en­
force a legislative provision that has not received the sanction of 
the body enacting it. The Court’s function is to take the by-law 
as it finds it, and not to correct and patch bad drafting. It would 
be an abuse of its powers to do so.
In a zoning by-law, it is imperative that the wording be clear 
and unambiguous. This type of by-law is an interference with the 
common law right of a person to use his property in any manner 
he sees fit. For this reason he must be able to determine whether 
or not the by-law applies to his property.20 A mere reference in the 
by-law to a plan which describes the area, will not be sufficient 
to save the enactment unless the plan is incorporated in the by­
law itself.21
On many occasions in recent years, municipalities have at­
tempted to regulate specific developments through the use of the 
zoning by-law. Conditions relating to specific undertakings are 
prescribed when the zoning change is effected. In some instances 
a collateral agreement is entered into setting out the various con­
ditions.22 This type of agreement is not binding on the owner’s
18 McGillivray J. A. in Municipal District of Springbank v Render [1936]
2 W.W.R. 430 at 436.
19 Re Goldstein and City of Windsor (1928) 35 O.W.N. 9
20 Campbell v City of Regina (1967) 63 D.L.R. (2d) 188. A consider­
able number of decisions have dealt with problems relating to the 
absence or insufficiency of a description, for example: Re Goldstein 
and City of Windsor (1928) 35 O.W.N. 9; Re Boivin and Township 
of Teck [1955] O.W.N. 763; In re Simmons and Township of Chat­
ham 21 U.C.Q.B. 75; In re Sydenham School Section (1903) 6 O.L.R. 
417; Brown v County of York 8 U.C.Q.B. 596; In re Smith and 
Council of Euphemia 8 U.C.Q.B. 222; McIntyre v Municipal Council 
of Bosanquet 11 U.C.Q.B. 460; Haacke v Municipality of Markham
17 U.C.Q.B. 562; Wannamaker v Green 10 O.R. 457.
21 Brown v County of York 8 U.C.Q.B. 596
22 In re North York By-law 14067 (1960) 24 D.L.R. (2d) 12, the On­
tario Municipal Board attached considerable weight to a collateral 
agreement entered into between the municipality and a developer. Mc- 
Gillvray J. said: “This factor of a collateral agreement should be 
given no weight or consideration by the Board when weighing the de­
sirability of giving its approval of the by-law.” The decision indicates 
that there is no objection to a collateral agreement which in fact may 
supplement the zoning by-law.
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successors in title, unless it is made a convenant running with the 
land.
One difficulty inherent in attacking conditions to a zoning 
by-law is largely a problem of drafting. The conditions must 
firstly be such as are competent for a council to enact under its 
zoning powers, and secondly they must be certain. It is exceeding­
ly difficult when attempting to draft conditions to regulate an in­
dustrial complex, to avoid an infringement of the rules against 
uncertainty.
In Re Mississauga Golf and Country Club, 28 a special zone 
was created for a service station, in which conditions were im­
posed. Two of these conditions or limitations provided as follows:
(a) A “Van Horne” type gasoline service station constructed of 
Credit Valley Stone.
(c) No commercial vehicle shall be serviced except for refuelling 
and emergencies not requiring the parking of any vehicle for a 
period longer than 15 minutes.
Mr. Justice Kelly at p. 679-680, commented on condition
(a) in these words:
Unless “Van Hom e” type is a term capable of the exact recog­
nition by some standard defined in the by-law or so generally 
accepted as to make definition unnecessary, the condition would 
appear to be a doubtful exercise of the powers of council.
As to condition (c) he said:
Condition (c) contains a limitation on the servicing of commer­
cial vehicles. While this may be strictly within the restriction of 
the use of land, whereas here it is coupled with “emergencies not 
requiring the parking of any such vehicle for a period longer than
15 minutes” it introduces an element of vagueness which in itself 
would be fatal.
These two illustrations indicate the extreme difficulty facing 
a municipal draftsman in preparing these conditions. The complex 
problem in defining a “Van Horne” service station or what con­
stitutes an emergency may well be insurmountable.
The decision raises the question of the applicability of the 
traditional rules of uncertainty to a modern zoning by-law. With 
the difficulty inherent in stating restrictions in a manner perfectly 
clear to all who read, it may well be time to review and recon­
sider some of these traditional rules.




A municipality is concerned primarily with two functions, 
namely, legislative and administrative. The first involves the ex­
ercising of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Provincial 
Legislature, such as enacting by-laws to put the authorized auth­
ority into effect. The second is concerned with administration of 
these local laws, the granting of permits, licenses, etc.
It is exceedingly clear that the administrative function can­
not be dealt with by the council itself. If this was necessary, the 
entire local governmental process would be disrupted. Therefore, 
for practical reasons, there should be no objection to council dele­
gating such functions to designated officials.
On the other hand the legislative function of a municipality is, 
as the name implies, the creation of local by-laws, within the terms 
of the delegated authority. It must be remembered that the mem­
bers of council are the locally elected officials charged with the 
duty of carrying out a legislative program for the benefit of the 
locality. There is, of course, no legislative program in the Pro­
vincial or Federal sense. Party politics of some description must 
necessarily be part of the municipal scene for this to materialize. 
However, the council is charged with the responsibility of deter­
mining what legislation to enact for its jurisdictional locality. To 
permit a delegation of this function would depart from the principle 
of direct responsibility. It has always been assumed that the Leg­
islature did not intend that the subordinate agency should have 
power to further delegate the legislative responsibility imposed on 
it.
The policy reason for not permitting delegation is stated in 
Re Elliott.1
T his. . .  is a delegation of authority that cannot be justified; for 
the Council has really delegated to an official the judgment and 
discretion that the Legislature intended and expected that it would 
exercise itself. It is manifest that such a delegation of authority 
might result in injustice and hardship . .  .2
> 11 Man. L.R. 358 at 363.
2 The principle against delegation is clearly enunciated per Hod- 
gins J. A. in Forest v City of Toronto (1923) 54 O.L.R. 256 at 
275: “ . . .  they cannot delegate to any individual the right to per­
form their duty, nor can they substitute the discretion of one of 
their officials for their own.” The comments of Dennistown J.A. 
in In Re By-law No. 92, Town of Winnipeg Beach, 30 Man. L.R. 
192 at 196 are also relevant on this point: “Powers which are 
given to a council constituted to act as one deliberative body to 
the end that the members may assist each other by their mayor 
alone.” See also the judgment of Garrow. J. A. in Russell v City
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There now can therefore be no question with the basic prin­
ciple of non-delegation. The only real problem presented in any 
situation is whether or not the alleged delegation is sufficient to 
warrant striking down the by-law.
It is also necessary to determine, when considering an alleg­
ed delegation, if the function delegated is legislative or adminis­
trative. No clear and precise statement can be made as to what 
will be deemed to be a legislative or an administrative act. This 
is something that must be ascertained as each situation comes be­
fore the Court. The one general statement though that can be 
made in this respect is, that if a discretion must be exercised by 
the official, then in all likelihood he is exercising a legislative 
function.3
This statement can serve only as a general rule because in 
each instance the type or extent of the discretion involved must 
be examined. This does not mean then a municipal officer cannot 
make a decision. A building inspector, for example must 
decide whether or not a given plan meets the by-law rquirements, 
but in this situation he has no arbitrary authority to reject the 
plans, or to impose conditions, not present in the by-law.4
It was implied in the judgment of Cartwright J. in City of 
Toronto v Outdoor Neon Displays Ltd.6 that a discretion can be 
vested in a municipal official. He stated that the by-law before the 
Court when properly interpreted did not confer any “uncontrolled 
discretion” on the inspector. It can only be assumed that it was 
not intended that a controlled discretion was permissible. What 
would be an example of a controlled discretion is difficult to con­
ceive. An examination of the balance of the reasons for judgment 
bear out the conviction that a “controlled discretion” in fact would 
mean no discretion at all, and merely the exercising of the min­
isterial function of determining the adequacy of the plans in re­
lation to the by-law. Any other approach would clearly have been 
in conflict with existing case law.
The type of discretion here being discussed is not to be con­
fused with the type of ministerial discretion considered in such
of Toronto (1908) 15 O.L.R. 484; Hitchock v Galveston 96 U.S.
341; Examples of the application of the principle can be seen in:
In re Robertson and Township of North Easthope (1888) 15 O.R.
423; Simon v Gastonguay (1931) 2 M.P.R. 470.
3 Rc Kowal and Township of Nelson [1953] O.W.N. 463.
4 Under s. 31 (1) (3) of The Planning Act, R.S.O. 1960 c. 296, council 
may by by-law authorize the building inspector to permit deviations
from the plans, where in his judgment it is warranted.
6 [1960J S.C.R. 307.
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cases as Russell v City of Toronto,® Regina v Joy Oil Co. Ltd.1 
and Regina v Campbell* It is clear that the council could not as a 
body pass on each individual tax sale, supervise the location of fire 
prevention apparatus, or designate all of the conditions under 
which speeches could be delivered in a park.
Many of the delegation cases are directed at the same prob­
lem that permeates the question of uncertainty, namely the right 
of the individual who must comply with a by-law to know what
conditions he must meet and what course of action will invoke 
retribution. The evil with which the Court is concerned is the un­
controlled, arbitrary power of an individual to grant or refuse the 
dispensation of a license or some other municipal prerogative.
The headnote to the case of Vic’s Restaurant Inc. v City of 
MontreaP gives an excellent summary of the guiding principles:
It is one thing and quite proper, for the municipal council, when 
authorized to pass licensing by-laws, to lay down particular rules 
by which the grant or refusal of a licence will be governed and 
to confide administration of these rules to a subordinate depart­
ment. It is quite another thing, and improper, for a municipality 
to give a discretionary power to a subordinate department unfet­
tered by any stipulated standard or rule by which it must be gov­
erned.
Under a by-law to regulate, control and license, it is quite 
clear there is no power to impose a condition similar to that con­
sidered in the Vic Restaurant Case,10 or to refuse a license to a 
person not above moral reproach. This type of provision really 
has no relation to the regulation of a trade or business, no matter 
how desirable it may seem to be. On the other hand, if the Leg­
islature has given authority to prescribe the qualifications of
• (1908) 15 O.L.R. 484.
7 [1963] 3 C.C.C. 260; The case of Re Knox and City of Belleville 
(1913-14) 5 O.W.N. 237; is also an example of a delegation of a min­
isterial power.
8 [1962] O.R. 1134.
•  [1959] 17 D.L.R. (2d) 81. The question with which the Court was con­
cerned in the case was the refusal of written permission from the 
Chief of Police, required by the by-law, prior to the issuance of a 
restaurant license. The same principle is stated in such cases as: Leach 
v City of Regina (1965) 50 W.W.R. 129; Rex ex rel. Taylor v Kemp 
[1943] O.W.N. 54; Attorney-General and Town of Truro v Chambers 
Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. (1913) 14 D.L.R. 883; Re Martin 
and Fort Garry Rural Municipality (1959) 19 D.L.R. (2d) 578: Re­
gina v Carland Ltd. (1962) 38 W.W.R. 439; In re MacKenzie and 
The City of Brantford (1884) 4 O.R. 382.
io Rex v Sparks (1913' 10 D.L.R. 616.
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license applicants, it has been held that such a condition is auth­
orized.11
It is now general practice to give an unlimited discretion to 
municipal councils to grant or refuse a license. Under these pro­
visions, a carefully worded by-law could require a police report 
which, if unfavourable, could be the basis for refusing the license. 
If the report is sought by the licensing agency only as a source of 
information this will not be considered as a delegation to the re­
porting agency.12
The rules applicable to a discretion in granting a license are 
equally applicable to a refusal. The words of Cartwright J. in 
Bridge v The Queen 13 are worthy of note:
It is within the powers of the Council to prescribe a state of fact« 
the existence of which shall render an occupier ineligible to re­
ceive a permit for a stated time; but express words in the enabl­
ing Statute would be necessary to give the Council power to con­
fer on an individual the right to decide, on such evidence as he 
might find sufficient, whether or not the prescribed state of facts 
exists and there are no such words.
The right to retain a license or permit, once obtained, is a 
right that has always been jealously guarded by the Courts. The 
situations under which it can be lost must be clearly defined in 
precise and unequivocal language. Clearly no arbitrary cancella­
tion by an official or by council will be permitted.14
11 Elves v City of Edmonton 9 Alb. L.R. 530. See also: Re Validity of 
Charlottetown Taxi By-law 122 C.C.C 51.
12 Regina vY u le (  1962) 33 D.L.F. (2d) 179. In both this case and in the 
Elves Case an appeal could be taken to council on the unfavourable 
report. This was probably more significant than the wording of the 
Act to the Court in reaching the conclusion that there was no dele­
gation. This fact clearly indicated that council was retaining control 
and the report was not final. In Re Lem Yuk and City of Kingston 
(1926) 31 O.W.N. 14 the Police Commissioners were required to ap­
prove the location of any business before a license could be issued 
although they had no authority to expressly refuse a license. It was 
held that this practice was not objectionable.
18 [1953] 1 S.C.R. 8 at 13. The Court found that sufficient detail had 
been set out in the by-law as to when permits could be issued. This 
being so, his function was purely administrative. Aylesworth J. A. in 
Re M usty’s Service Stations Ltd. & Ottawa [1959] O.R. 342 at 349 
stated the law very concisely: “Such things as the physical issuing of 
the permit may be delegated by municipal by-law if, but only if, the 
council clearly has prescribed the facts which establish eligibility for 
a permit.”
14 The following cases are instructive on this point: Re Foster and City 
of Hamilton (1899) 31 O.R. 292; In re By-law No. 92, Town of Win­
nipeg Beach [1919] 3 W.W.R. 696.
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Some reference must be made to Rex ex rel. Fletcher v Joy 
Oil Co. Ltd. 15 Under an early closing by-law permits to remain 
open could be issued by the chief constable acting with an advis­
ory committee of council. Those eligible were selected on a rota­
tion basis. Provision was also made for cancellation of permits for 
cause. Mr. Justice Laidlaw at p. 171 justified upholding the by­
law in these words:
The legislation did not intend that council should pass upon each 
permit, but rather should establish a system for the issuing of 
permits. . .  The council of the municipality has not thereby di­
vested itself of power to amend the by-law from time to time by 
way of making exceptions to it or otherwise. It has made regu­
lations and imposed restrictions in respect of the issue of permits, 
and those regulations and restrictions are binding on the Commit­
tee and Constable . . .  The council of the municipality retains con­
trol in the matter of the issuing of permits and may alter the 
present regulations and restrictions in such manner and to such 
extent as in its discretion it deems necessary or advisable.
The decision advances a novel approach to the whole ques­
tion of delegation. As long as council retains the power of amend­
ment over its by-laws, which it cannot legally abrogate, any dele­
gation would be permissible under this rule. This is contrary to 
the rules developed in the delegation area. This decision may well 
be treated as overruled in fact, although not expressly, by Bridge 
v The Queen.™
There are three general areas in which delegation should be 
considered; (1) where the entire jurisdictional field has been va­
cated; (2) where a decision on a particular question is given to 
another agency or group; and (3) where a municipal official is 
given authority to determine the sufficiency of certain jurisdic­
tional requirements.
Clearly council cannot delegate an entire legislative field to 
an individual or agency. An attempt to do so was considered in 
Re Clements and Toronto.11 Council had given authority to the 
Commissioner of Parks to designate the sites to be used for park­
ing purposes on lands under his jurisdiction. The principle enun­
ciated in the decision of Wells J. is— there cannot be a complete 
withdrawal by council from a particular legislative field. It must 
perform such functions itself, not being free to delegate these 
powers to someone else.
It is not uncommon for a council, when faced with a prob­
lem that could have political repercussions, to endeavour to shift
(1951) 98 C.C.C. 161.
10 [1953J 1 S.C.R. 8.
17 (1959) 19 D.L.R. (2d) 476, reversed on appeal (1960) 20 D.L.R. (2d) 
497) on other grounds.
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the decision making process to the shoulders of some other per­
son or group. A good example appears in the case of Re Kiely.18 
The by-law in question prohibited the construction of a livery 
stable unless the consent of a majority of the persons residing 
within five hundred feet of the proposed stable was obtained. 
Chief Justice Wilson hesitantly concluded that the consent requir­
ed by the by-law could not properly be demanded. The principle 
indicated in this judgment at p. 457 may be stated in this way:
It may not be possible to require an applicant for a license to 
obtain the consents demanded as a condition precedent to his ob­
taining his license, for that is a matter in the discretion of the 
commissioners upon which they must be guided by their own 
judgement. It is somewhat of a delegation to the persons whose 
consent is to be exercised by the commissioners.
Mr. Justice Wells in Re Davies and Village of Forest Hill19 
was confronted with this same problem, only in a more modern 
setting. The by-law considered by him was one which under cer­
tain specified circumstances required the consent of adjoining 
property owners to the installation of a swimming pool. His Lord­
ship said at p. 245:
It is clear that a municipal council may delegate to others purely 
ministerial matters, but in the absence of clear statutory authority 
the exercise of a dicsiciionary power vested in a municipal coun­
cil cannot tv* delegated. lh? provision requiring the consent of 
nearby owners is an attempt to do what the law prohibits and 
is invalid.
Therefore council cannot delegate the actual decision mak­
ing itself, but there is no objection to its obtaining advice or opin­
ions from adjoining property owners or other persons. Chief 
Justice Wilson in Re Kiely20 said:
The commissioners could no doubt take an opinion from any one 
or from any body to enable them to decide whether the license 
should be granted or not, and exercise their judgment upon such 
information.
Similarly there is no objection to council sending an official 
to investigate a problem and report. This question was discussed 
by Meredith J. in In Re Dundas Street Bridges21:
Council did form and express their opinion. There was no reason 
why council could not send a competent official to investigate 
and report. There was no need for them to go as a group, or in­
dividually. After obtaining it they then, upon the petition and re­
port, their own knowledge, and all other information had, pro­
ceeded and expressed their opinion in accordance with their of­
ficer’s report, except on one point where they differed from him.
18 (1887) 13 O.R. 451. A similar situation was considered in Regina v 
Webster (1889) 16 O.R. 187. The principle laid down by Wilson C J. 
was applied and the by-law struck down.
I» (1965) 1 O.R. 240.
20 (1887) 13 O.R. 451 at 457.
21 (1904) 8 O.L.R. 52 at 56.
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Council should always make it abundantly clear that the re­
port is only information that will be considered in the decision 
making process. One can only speculate on what conclusion might 
have been reached in the Dundas Case if council had not differed 
in that one respect from the engineers report.
Another tactic utilized by council is that of submitting ques­
tions to the electorate before making a decision whether or not 
to pass a particular by-law. It is assumed there is no statutory re­
quirement to do so. If the purpose of submitting a question to the 
electorate is merely to obtain an expression of opinion then such 
course of action is not objectionable. If, however, the intention is 
to accept the result as binding then it would be the duty of the 
Court to intervene and restrain the submission of the question.22
With the advent of public participation in the zoning pro­
cess, councils will be confronted with increasing demands for de­
cisions to be referred to local affected groups for their opinions 
and recommendations. It seems, from the tenor of some of the 
proposals, that the proponents of community autonomy have not 
as yet had occasion to consider some of the legal problems in­
herent in their suggestions. It is clearly evident that with an urban 
renewal project council could not properly agree to be bound by 
a decision of the local residents affected. This would offend the 
principles enunciated in Re Kiely?z Regina v Webster24 and Re 
Davies and Village of Forest Hill.‘2f>
To accept the principles inherent in the arguments in favour 
of public participation, is to recognize that a considerable re­
vamping of present municipal ideas must be made. The first ac­
cepted municipal legal principle that must go is that disapproving 
of delegation by local councils.
Delegation may also be evident in areas where certain con­
ditions must be met in order to confer jurisdiction on the council, 
for example, where a petition is necessary before any action can
22 Davies v City of Toronto (1888) 15 O.R. 33. It is not proposed to 
enter into a discussion of the advisability and other ramifications of 
of the question of a referendum. Some of the considerations applic­
able to such an undertaking are evidenced in such cases as: Helm  v 
Town of Port Hope 22 Gr. 273; Vickers v Shuniah 22 Gr. 410; King 
v City of Toronto (1903) 5 O.L.R. 163; Burlington Public School 
Board v Town of Burlington (1918) 44 O.L.R. 561; Jenkins v City 
of Winnipeg (1941] 1 W.W.R. 37; Re Hill Rust Wine Co. Ltd. v 
City of Peterborough [1940] O.W.N. 25; Re Jones and City of To­
ronto [1947] O.R. 20; Re Lillis and City of Kingston [1949] O.W.N. 
30; Re Thomas and City of Hamilton (1938) 69 C.C.C. 299; Re Wet-
more and Town of Timmins [1925] O.R. 13
2» (1887) 13 O.R. 451.
2< (1889) 16 O.R. 187.
2« (1965) 1 O.R. 240.
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be taken. The usual statutory requirement would insist on a cer­
tain percentage of the members of the class, seeking the interven­
tion of the municipal legislature, completing a petition to elicit 
that support. It is not uncommon for a procedural by-law to make 
provisions for dealing with petitions in this type of situation. In 
some instances they will provide that the Clerk will review the 
signatures and will then issue a certificate as to the sufficiency of 
them. Unless the statute specifically provides that his certificate 
will be final and conclusive, council cannot treat it as such. It can 
only be accepted as evidence of compliance with the statute. 
Council must still satisfy that it in fact meets the requirements of 
the statute. This problem could be handled in the same manner 
as the report in the Dundas Case. Any attempts to do otherwise 
will be held invalid as an illegal delegation.27
Another area where delegation appears is that in which a by­
law leaves some matter or thing to be determined by some ex­
ternal agency, for example, a tax rate to be set by trustees of a 
school board,28 or the determination of what are proper business 
hours.29
In Re Cloutier,30 the City of Winnipeg passed an early clos­
ing by-law requiring among other things the closing of shops on 
certain specified days, including the days on which a named or­
ganization held an exhibition. It was held that the by-law was bad 
because it delegated to this association the power of determining 
the days on which shops should be closed.
Regina v McMillan, 31 an Ontario decision, a different ap­
proach was taken. The Court refused to follow Re Cloutier. Chief 
Justice Armour said at p. 173:
There is no delegation of authority in providing that certain days 
upon which something may take place, and the fixing of which 
belongs to another body, shall be excepted from the operation of 
the by-law any more than it would have been a delegation of 
authority to have excepted any day appointed by the Governor- 
General -----for a public holiday.
It is possible to reconcile the two decisions on their facts. In 
Regina v McMillan the days on which closing was excepted were 
those on which a particular exhibition was to be held. In Re Clou­
27 This situation was considered in: Halladay v The City of Ottawa (1907)
14 D.L.R. 458, and on appeal 15 O.L.R. 65; Re Kamloops City By­
law No. 990. (1947) 2 D.L.F. 541; Re Grei and City of Toronto 
[1934] O.R. 514.
28 R v Middleton and Township of Goderich [1931] O.R. 392.
29 Marilyn Investments Ltd. v Rural Municipality of Assiniboia. (1965) 
51 D.L.R. (2d) 711.
30 11 Man. L.R. 220.
31 (1898) 28 O.R. 172.
U.N.B. LA W  JOURNAL 41
tier, the days in question were those on which an association 
would hold an exhibition. There was nothing to prevent the as­
sociation in the Cloutier Case from holding any number of ex­
hibitions anywhere in the Province, so that an impossible situation 
could develop.
If an individual deals with a committee of council, or other 
agency exercising delegated authority, he must ascertain if council 
has in fact power to delegate such authority to the committee. 
Council can ratify the decision of any such committee, 32 but if 
it does not do so, the individual has no recourse. The position of 
the individual was indicated in Easterr Securities Co. v City of 
Sidney.™:
. . .  individuals dealing with them must at their peril ascertain 
that the statutory body which assumes to delegate important func­
tions involving the exercise of discretion to committees or persons 
has in fact the power to delegate and that the particular person 
dealt with is acting pursuant to due authority so lawfully dele­
gated.
Municipal councils in a modern society are showing increas­
ing concern with the problems of pollution. Many industrial un­
dertakings, if not rigidly controlled, will contribute greatly to ex­
isting problems of pollution. It is an accepted practice to attempt 
to prevent many of these problems through the imposition of con­
ditions in the zoning by-law.
In urban municipalities where pollution is a significant prob­
lem, council frequently will have available to it a wealth of tech­
nical assistance.34 From the point of view of council, a reason­
able condition to impose in attempting to eliminate a potential 
pollution problem would be: “The developer shall install anti­
pollution equipment satisfactory to the Commissioner of Works.”
The Commissioner has himself, or available to him, all of 
the technical information necessary to determine what type of 
equipment will be effective to carry out the desired objective. 
Better results would be obtainable from pursuing this method than 
attempting to detail the requirements in the by-law. Clearly the 
suggested condition would offend against the rule of non-dele- 
gation.
82 Hitchcock v City of Galveston 96 U.S. 341.
33 (1923) 4 D.L.R. 717 at 722.
34 In Ontario, pollution is primarily the concern of the Provincial Gov­
ernment. Reference may be had to The Ontario Water Resources 
Commission A ct R.S.O. 1960. c. 281, and amendments thereto, and 
to The A ir Pollution Control A ct 1967. R.S.O. 1967 c. 2 and amend­
ments thereto.
In a modern technological society there is considerable merit 
to the position taken by the Courts of the United States on the 
question of delegation. Brown J. speaking for the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Fisher v St. Louis35 said:
. . .  we see no difficulty in vesting in some body of men, pre­
sumed to be acquainted with the business and its conditions, the 
power to grant permits in special cases . . .  Authority to delegate 
that discretion to a board appointed for that purpose is sustained 
by the great weight of authority.
This rule seems better suited to the problem indicated above. 
The difficulty with this approach is that the municipal official may 
tend to be unduly restrictive, in that he may require equipment of 
a higher degree of efficiency than is absolutely imperative under 
the circumstances. This is a normal reaction, especially where his 
decision may become a question of public controversy. One an­
swer may be to provide, in questions of doubt, an appeal to a 
panel of experts.
Approaching the rule against delegation from this direction 
indicates clearly its shortcomings when applied to particular mod­
ern problems. The traditional rule against delegation is found 
wanting when applied to special zoning conditions. Changes in this 
respect can only be achieved through legislative intervention.
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The powers of the council must be exercised bona fide and the 
action of its members must not be founded upon fraud, oppres­
sion or improper motives.1
This principle is fundamental to the validity of any munici­
pal enactment. If council, in passing a by-law, acts in bad faith, 
then such by-law must be invalidated.
The difficulty in determining what will constitute bad faith 
is evident from the remarks of Britton J. in Re Hamilton Powder 
Co. and Township of Gloucesterr
Bad faith does not mean some particular advantage to one or 
more members of the council. It is not necessary to establish en­
mity or ill-will on the part of one or more members against a 
person interested in a by-law or contract. It may be bad faith 
without corrupt motives, and it may not be bad faith, although 
local feelings and prejudices influence members of a council in 
their action.
A by-law enacted in bad faith is a nullity,3 and can be at­
tacked at any time in a proper action. It is in the same position 
as one passed without any pretext to statutory authority. The 
mere effluxion of time will not validate such a provision.
What does or does not constitute bad faith is a question of 
fact to be determined on the evidence adduced.4 The good faith 
(if the council will, as a matter of law be presumed until the con­
trary is proved.5
Generally speaking the onus of proving bad faith is on the 
person who alleges it,6 namely, the person applying to quash the
1 Re Howard and City of Toronto (1927) 61 O.L.R. 563 (Masten J. A.) 
at 574 quoting Davis v Bromley Corp. [1908] 1 K.B.170.
2 13 O.W.R. 661 at 664. The only real certainty obtained from the de­
cision is that if council deliberately sets about terminating a proper 
and valid contract, it will be considered as having acted in bad faith. 
In some situations, a failure to obtain legal advice may be a sufficient 
justification for imputing mala fides to the council. See: McDonald v 
Lancaster Separate School Trustees (1926) 31 O.L.R. 360.
3 Kuchma v The Rural Municipality of Tache [1945] S.C.R. 234; Hewit 
v Rural Municipality of Charleswood 66 Man. R. 1.
4 Beemer v Village of Grimsby 13 O.A.R. 225. In Rex v DeClute [1951]
4 D.L.R. 854, it was held that if an appeal was limited to a question 
of law, no argument could be heard on bad faith.
6 La Ville Saint-Laurent v Marien [1962] S.C.R. 580; Re Crabbe and 
Swan River (1927) 23 Man. R. 14.
Re Howard and City of Toronto (1927) 61 O.L.R. 563; Kuchma v 
The Rural Municipality of Tache [1945] S.C.R. 234; Short v Poole 
Corporation [1926] 1 Ch. 66; Keily v City of Edmonton [1931] 1 W. 
W.R. 365; The Metropolitan Stores Limited  v Hamilton [1945] O.R. 
590; Re Hagen and City of Sault St. Marie (1921) 60 D.L.R. (2d) 584.
by-law or the party raising the objection in any action. Clear and 
unequivocal proof will be required before the Court will inter­
vene.7
Mr. Justice Spence considered the question of onus in City 
of Ottawa cl al v Boyd Builders Ltd.H His Lordship stated at p. 
412 that on an application for a mandamus to compel the issu­
ance of a building permit, the plaintiff:
. . .  could insist upon the hearing of the application for manda­
mus that the municipality manifest that it had a clear zoning plan 
upon which it was proceeding in good faith and with dispatch. In 
so far as the previous sentence puts the onus upon the munici­
pality, 1 agree with counsel for the respondent that such is the ef­
fect of Sun Oil v Whitby, and the judgment of LeBell J. in Bol­
ton v Munro et al. The judgment of this Court in Kuchma v 
Rural Municipality of Tache, and that of the Appellate Division 
in Re Howard and City of Toronto, fiing the onus upon the ap­
plicant should be confined to the situation where the applicant 
seeks to quash a by-law. There the applicant is in a position of a 
plaintiff and has the onus, and particularly has the onus of prov­
ing bad faith. On the other hand, where the applicant seeks a 
mandamus to which he has a prima facie right and the munici­
pality seeking to defeat that prima facie right alleges, inter alia, 
its good faith the onus should be on it to establish such good 
faith.
On an application for mandamus, the applicant needs only 
to establish its prima facie right to the relief requested. The onus 
is then on the municipality to prove that the permit was refused 
by the council acting in good faith. In any other action, the onus 
is clearly on the plaintiff to establish the bad faith alleged.
It is assumed that the reference by Spence J. confining the 
onus of proving bad faith to a person making application to quash 
a by-law is not restricted to the technical meaning of the phrase 
“application to quash”. To so restrict these words would be tan­
tamount to suggest that in any other action attacking a by-law, 
council must negative an allegation of bad faith. Assuming the 
necessity of proving bad faith, what factors must be considered? 
In Rowland v Town of Collingwood,9 Britton J. laid down three 
rules or criteria which the Courts may use to determine this ques­
tion:
To determine this question of bona fides, I must look: (1) at the 
object the Legislature had in view in the legislation; (2) the 
powers and duty of the council under it; and (3) the circum­
stances under which, and how and why, the council passed the 
by-law.
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7 Gilmore v Township of Westminister (1929) 64 O.L.R. 344; Re Burns 
and Township of Haldimand (1966) 52 D.L.F. (2d) 101.
8 [1965] S.C.R. 408. For a statement of facts in this case and a
more detailed discussion of the judgement see infra pp. 190-194
• (1908) 16 O.L.R. 272 at 273.
Initially it must be determined what the legislature intended 
council to achieve under the particular legislation. The second 
step is to determine what the council itself was endeavouring to 
achieve through passing a by-law under this legislation. If the ob­
jective of the council corresponds to the intention of the Legisla­
ture, and the by-law is in other respects valid, its validity is not 
open to question. If, however, it is apparent that council has some 
ulterior objective, then it may well be held that bad faith has been 
established.
A municipality, being a creature of statute, cannot do indi­
rectly what it cannot do directly.10 Scott v Corporation of Tilson- 
burg11 affords an example of this principle. The council wishing to 
obtain a railway line, but being somewhat skeptical of the possi­
bility of a by-law to raise the necessary money being approved by 
the electors (such approval being necessary to raise money for this 
purpose), devised what seemed to be an acceptable plan. In con­
sideration of a local industrialist procuring the railroad at his ex­
pense, a tax exemption was granted to him. The council would 
thus have attained by indirect methods an object they were unable 
to attain directly.
Unfortunately for council, the Court of Appeal was not im­
pressed. Chief Justice Hagerty, summarized the applicable prin­
ciples in these words at pp. 237 and 240:
I think we must always, in examining a by-law, see that it is 
passed for the purpose allowed by the statute, and that such pur­
pose is not resorted to as a pretext to cover an evasion of a clear 
statuable duly— that it is, in short, a by-law for exemption, and 
not a mere pretext to cover the wrong committed by the council 
in applying the assets or monies of the corporation in a manner 
forbidden without the consent of the ratepayers . . .  Releasing an 
individual from payment of his taxes on condition of his paying 
the required amount for the desired object. . .  is a clear violation 
of duty.
The principle enunciated in this decision is necessary both 
for the protection of the ratepayers in general and for the indivi­
dual in particular. Examples abound throughout the reports where 
councils have endeavoured through the use of their regulatory 
powers to prohibit what was considered an offensive trade or bus­
iness.12 Even where express power is given to prohibit, the Courts
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10 The Shawinigan Hydro-Electric Co. v The Shawinigan Water and 
Power Company [1912] 45 S.C.R. 585 (Indington J.); Re Kamloops 
City By-law No. 990 [1947] 2 D.L.R. 541; In re Caddell [1947] 2 W. 
W.R. 40; Spiers v Township of Toronto [1956] O.W.N. 427; Re Fos­
ter and Township of Raleigh (1910) 22 O.L.R. 26.
11 13 O.A.R. 233
12 Re Kowal and Township of Nelson [1953] O.W.N. 463; Rowland v 
Town of Collingwood (1908) 16 O.L.R. 272; In re Barclay and Town­
ship of Darlington 12 U.C.Q.B. 86; In re Gray stock and Municipality 
of Otonabee 12 U.C.Q.B. 458; Re Lane and City of Oshawa [1940] 
O.W.N. 349; The question was placed before the Court, but not found 
to be established in Re Brigden and Village of Port Elgin [1934] O. 
W.N. 632.
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have always scrutinized very closely a by-law enacted thereunder. 
Even the slightest departure from the enabling legislation would 
be fatal to the by-law. Given this background, it is naive to sug­
gest that a Court would grant credence to an attempt to interfere 
with a lawful calling by some surreptitious and devious means.
If the evidence establishes that a by-law, prima facie, within 
the authority of council, is directed at some object not authorized, 
bad faith will be presumed.13
A plaintiff attempting to establish bad faith though, will not 
be permitted to embark on a inquisition into the motives of each 
individual member of council.
It has been frequently stated that the Courts will not inquire into 
the motives that may have actuated council members in passing 
a by-law in the absence of a special interest disqualifying a particu­
lar member from voting except where such motive has been evi­
denced by some overt act of bad faith.14
If the person attacking the by-law can show a personal in­
terest on the part of a member of council, within the rule stated 
by Meredith J. at p. 236 In re L ’Abbé and Corporation of Blind 
River15, then he will be successful:
A member of a municipal council is disqualified from voting in 
proceedings involving his personal or pecuniary interests; and an 
ordiance or resolution, passed by the concurrence of one or more 
members so disqualified, is void.
18 In re Campbell and Village of Lanark 20 O.A.R. 372; G. S. Skipp <& 
Son Limited v Township of Toronto [1952] O.W.N. 793; Re Waimer 
Investments Ltd. and City of North Bay [1970] 1 O.R. 109; The Bell 
Telephone Co. v Town of Owen Sound (1904) 8 O.L.R. 74; In re 
Morton and City of St. Thomas 6 O.A.R. 323; Crichton v Township 
of Chapleau (1915) 8 O.W.N. 67; London and Northwestern Ry. Co. 
v City of Westminister [1904] 1 Ch. 759; Westminister Corporation v 
London and Northwestern Ry. Co. (1905) A.C. 426; Re Cities Ser­
vice Oil Co. Ltd. and Kingston (1956) 5 D.L.R. (2d) 126; The com­
ments of Hogg J. A. in Brampton Enterprises v Milk Board [1956] 
O.R. 1, are also relevant on this point. Hatton v City of Peterborough 
(1919) 16 O.W.N. 191. Vasilatos v City of Victoria (1910) 15 B.C.R. 
153.
14 Schroder J. A. (dissenting) in Re Burns and Township of Haldimand 
(1966) 52 D.L.R. (2d) 101 at 103. See also: Re Foster and Township 
of Raleigh (1910) 22 O.L.R. 26, and United Buildings Corporation v
City of Vanvouver [1915] A.C. 345.
16 (1904) 7 O.L.R. 230; Some other decisions which are informative on 
this question are: George v Ontario Amiesite Co. Ltd. (1926) 31 O.W. 
N. 4; In re Vashon and Township of East Hawkesbury 30 U.C.C.P. 
194; Re Baird and Village of Almonte 41 U.C.Q.B. 415; Elliott v 
City of St. Catharines 18 O.L.R. 57; Buffington Wheel Co. v Burn­
ham 60 Iowa 493; Re Bluestein and Borough of North York (1967) 
61 D.L.R. (2d) 659; Starr v City of Calgary (1966) 52 D.L.R. (2d) 
726; Tonks v Reid [1967] S.C.R. 81; Regina ex rel Wright v Martin 
(1966) 55 D.L.R. (2d) 399; In Kennedy v Thussalon [1960] O.W.N. 
478, the Court refused to quash the resolution, even though the Reeve
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If the interest of the member of council whose motives are 
questioned is no different from that of any other ratepayer in the 
municipality, or in the area affected by the by-law, then such in­
terest is not one that will disqualify him.16 His interest must be 
“immediate, particular and distinct from the public interest”.17 
Apart from this rather obvious situation the motives of the indivi­
dual members are not open to inquiry.
It would seem that bad faith, like any other objectionable 
feature, may be applicable to only a portion of a by-law, so that 
a severance of the tainted part will be permitted.18 If the council’s 
prime motivation is one of bad faith, then surely the entire enact­
ment should fall, and not merely that portion which affects the 
person against whom it was directed. It is difficult to conceive 
how one dissects bad faith.
If mala fides is not established on the part of council, assum­
ing that the by-law is otherwise valid, then it is necessarily above 
reproach:
. . .  in the absence of mala fides on the part of the majority of
the members of the council, the Court had no right to interfere.10
After discounting male fides, the question of whether the by­
law is a proper one is a political question which can only be de­
termined by the elected representatives, and their judgment is con­
clusive, at least until the next election.
The particular applicability of bad faith to a zoning by-law 
will be considered in detail in the discussion of The City of Ot­
tawa et al v Boyd Builders Ltd.20
obviously came within the rule. This was justified on the basis that 
the amount was small, and the Reeve was acting in good faith, and 
only one member voted against the resolution. To say the basis for 
the decision is questionable, is an understatement. The case of Re 
Robertson and Township of Colborne (1912) 4 O.W.N. 274 also re­
presents an unwarranted departure from the rule.
16 Elliott v City of St. Catharines (1909) 18 O.L.R. 57. See also: Re M c­
Lean and Township of Ops 45 U.C.Q.B. 325; Buffington Wheel Co. 
v Burnham 60 Iowa 493; Steckart v City of East Saginaw 22 Mich. 
104; Re Bluestein and Borough of North York (1967) 61 D.L.R. (2d) 
659.
17 Elliott v City of St. Catharines (1909) 18 O.I.R. 57.
18 Re Hazen and City of Sault St. Marie (1967) 60 D.L.R. (2d) 584.
19 George v Ontario Amiesite Co. Ltd. (1926) 31 O.W.N. 4 (Grant J.) at 
p. 7. See also to the same effect: Larry v Village of Port Stanley 
[1968] 1 O.R. 36; Re Burns and Township of Haldimand (1966) 52
D.L.R. (2d) 101; Short v Poole Corporation [1920] 1 Ch. 66; Re 
Foster and Township of Raleigh (1910) 22 O.L.R. 26; Re Hammond 
[1950] 4 D.L.R. 26; Keily v City of Edmonton [1931] 1 W.W.R. 365; 
Re Robertson and Township of Calborne (1912) 4 O.W.N. 274. The 
remarks of Meredith C.J.O. in Jones v Tuckersmith (1915) 33 O.L.R. 
634 are also applicable.
20 [1965] S.C.R. 408; Infra pp. 191-195.
48
CHAPTER 14
The Impact of Ottawa et al v Boyd Builders Ltd. 
and Wiswell et al v Metropolitan Corporation 
of Greater Winnipeg on Zoning.
The Supreme Court of Canada in 1965 made two significant 
decisions in the zoning law field. These cases, Ottawa et al v Boyd 
Builders Ltd.1 and Wiswell et al v Metropolitan Corporation of 
Greater Winnipeg,2 emanated from zoning situations in the cities 
of Ottawa and Winnipeg respectively. Both related to zoning a- 
mendment by-laws and not to the creation of general zoning 
schemes.
Both decisions are concerned with procedural questions re­
lating to zoning and also with bad faith on the part of council. In 
view of the probable significance of the judgments in these cases 
it seems desirable to treat them separately rather than attempt to 
integrate them into a general discussion dealing with specific 
grounds of attacking by-laws.
Although the decisions are important in the discussions of 
zoning by-laws in any Province, it is proposed, for purposes of il­
lustration, to restrict the discussions to an examination of zoning 
by-laws under the Ontario procedure.
To one not versed in the intricacies of the Ontario procedure 
of creating zoning by-laws, the first exposure is something of a 
revelation.
The power to enact zoning by-laws is one conferred on muni­
cipalities in Ontario under the provisions of s. 30 (1) (2) of The 
Planning Act.3 By-laws passed pursuant to these provisions are not 
legally binding and enforceable until approved by the Ontario 
Municipal Board.4
There is no requirement in The Planning Act for the giving 
of notice to interested persons, of a council’s intention to consider 
the passing of a zoning by-law, or for an amendment thereto. If 
the proposed zoning amendment necessitates a change in the of­
ficial plan, the Planning Board must hold a meeting. Again there 
is no notice requirement.5 In a province which, by statute, pro­
» (1965) S.C.R. 408.
2 (1965) S.C.R. 512.
» R.S.O. 1960 c.296.
4 See s. 30 (9) of The Planning A ct R.S.O. 1960 c. 296.
6 Under s. 10 (1) (b) of The Planning Act R.S.O. 1960 c.296, the plan­
ning board is required to hold public meetings and publish informa­
tion for the purpose of obtaining the participation of the inhabitants 
in the planning area. This relates to considerations regarding the pro­
posed official plan.
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vides a summary method of quashing by-laws and permits rate­
payers to take action to enforce them, there seems to be a con­
tradiction in not providing some notice to those same ratepayers 
directly affcctcd by a zoning)by-law.
A zoning by-law may, without notice to anyone, be given all 
tiircc readings at one meeting. If in the opinion of council the situ­
ation so warrants. The by-law then goes before the Ontario Muni­
cipal Board for approval where notice that the municipality in­
tends to apply for approval must be given under rules of proce­
dure promulgated by the Ontario Municipal Board.6 Once there, 
it will be approved, rejected or altered within several months or 
years, depending inter alia on the nature of the change in zoning 
under consideration.
The effect of this procedure is to require opponents of the 
change to make their representations before a non-elccted admin­
istrative Board. The Board is not amenable to public pressure as 
would be the elected council. Thus the opponents of a by-law have 
been deprived of one of their primary weapons, that of public 
pressure.
It is against this background that Boyd Builders Case must 
be considered. It is first proposed to consider the law as it stood 
prior to these decisions.
The problem which came before the Court in the Boyd Case 
is the type that usually arises where an owner of property applies 
to the building inspector for a permit to construct a building for a 
particular use, for example, a high rise apartment building. As a 
result of the application in this case, a public outcry developed 
and council intervened on the side of the residents and enacted 
a restrictive by-law preventing the use. The permit refused, the 
only alternative left to the developer was to commence an appli­
cation for a mandamus, to compel the issuance of the permit.
Mandamus is a form of relief encrusted with technicalities. 
Before commencing an application, the applicant must be certain 
that all preliminary requirements for mandamus have been met. 
It will be imperative on him to establish his right to the remedy 
requested.7 In Karavos v The City of Toronto,8 four prerequisites 
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus were laid down:
6 See: The Ontario Municipal Board’s rules of procedure. Rule 1. N o­
tice must be given to property owners within 400 feet of the affected 
property. Objections may be sent to Council and must be considered 
by it. It is customary to hold a meeting to consider any objectionsi. 
The consideration given the by-law at this meeting is popularly known 
as fourth reading.
7 The Queen v The Guardians of the Lewisham Union (1897) 1 Q.B. 
498.
8 (1948) O.W.N. 17.
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(1) A  clear legal right to have the thing sought by it done, and 
done in the manner and by the person sought to be coerced;
(2) The duty whose performance it is sought to coerce by man­
dam us must be actually due and incumbent upon the officer at 
the time of seeking the relief, and the writ will not lie to compel 
the doing of an act which he is not yet under obligation to per­
form;9
(3) The duty must be purely ministerial in nature, plainly in­
cumbent upon an officer by operation of law or by virtue of his 
office, and concerning which he possesses no discretionary powers.
(4) There must be a demand and refusal to perform the act which 
it is sought to coerce by legal remedy.10
A mandamus can be issued to direct the carrying out of a 
duty even if that duty when exercised will involve a discretion. 
The Court, however, will not direct the manner in which that dis­
cretion shall be exercised, i.e. the manner in which the decision 
must be made.11
The issuance of the writ of mandamus is discretionary with 
the Court. It is a judicial discretion and must be:
. . .  exercised bona fide, not influenced by extraneous or irrelevant 
consideration, and not arbitrary or illegally. If the discretion is 
exercised it must be as a result of something connected with the 
right itself, and not something extraneous thereto.12
•  If the plans required by the by-law are not fully complete, the build­
ing inspector can refuse the permit. See, such cases as R e O ld Park  
Investm ents L im ited  and Toronto  (1955) O.W.N. 630; Dunn  v The 
Board of Education o f the Town o f W indsor (1885) 6 O.R. 125; Eller- 
by  v Winnipeg (1929) 38 Man. R. 621; Frankel v C ity  o f Winnipeg 
(1913) 23 Man. R. 296; Regina v Toronto E x parte 94 Crescent R oad  
L td. (1961) O.W.N. 129; On the general question of meeting the con­
ditions necessary for m andam us see: R e H am ilton Dairies Ltd. and  
Dundas (1927) 33 O.W.N. 113; R e W illiam s and Bram pton  17 O.L.R. 
398; R ex ex rei L ee  v Town o f Estevan  (1951) 3 W.W.R. (N.S.) 513; 
R e Provincial Board of Health and C ity  o f Toronto  46 O.L.R. 587; 
R e Peck and County o f Peterborough  34 U.C.Q.B. 129; The Queen v 
The Guardians o f the Lewisbam  Union (1897) 1 Q.B. 498; R e U cci 
and Toronto  (1955) O.W.N. 647; R e West N issouri Continuation  
School 38 O.L.R. 207.
10 The refusal does not need to be in express words, provided it is clear 
the municipal officer has no intention to carry out his duty. This is 
apparent from the following decisions: In re Township Clerk o f Eu­
phrasia 12 U.C.Q.B. 622; The K ing ex rei M athie  v H ew itt (1941) 3
D.L.R. 802; R e W est N issouri Continuation School 25 O.L.R. 550.
11 Sm ith  v Chorley Rural Council (1897) 1Q.B. 678; E lves v C ity  o f E d­
monton  9 Alta. L.R. 530; R e Dundass and M unicipality o f Chilliwack
1 W.L.R. 94.
12 O ’Connor v Jackson e t al (1943) O.W.N. 587; See also: R e Cosentino  
and The C ity  o f Toronto  (1934) O.W.N. 715.
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The Court in some instances has ordered the permit to be issued 
subject to the technical requirements of the by-law being met.13 
TTiis seems contrary to rules under which the discretion to issue the 
writ should be exercised. Surely it would be impossible for the 
applicant to show that he was legally entitled to the permit unless 
all of the by-law requirements had been met. The fact that there 
would be no point in complying exactly with the provisions of the 
by-law should not be accepted as a legitimate excuse for not so 
doing.
Mandamus clearly is not a remedy that readily will be grant­
ed. It must be apparent that the applicant has no other means of 
asserting his rights.14 It is equally clear that if compliance is not 
shown with the prerequisites laid down in the Karavos Case the 
application will be denied. The result of such refusal in the situa­
tion indicated would be a sufficient delay to enable the municipal­
ity to have the by-law approved by the Municipal Board.15
A serious problem usually arises in these situations where the 
municipality requests that the application be adjourned ine die 
pending consideration by the Municipal Board. The Court is then 
faced with an attempt to balance the public rights against the pri­
vate rights of the property owner.
M cRuer C.J.H.C. in Re Bridgman and Toronto,16 sets out the pri­
vate rights involved.
Every one has a right to use his property in any way that he sees 
fit, so long as he does nothing that will be a legal nuisance to his 
neighbours. That is a common law right. It is a question o f liberty 
that is to be jealously guarded by the Courts, and while one’s 
rights may be affected by proper legislative action, until that is 
done, one’s personal common law rights are to be strictly guarded.
Prior to the decision in the Boyd Builders Case, if an effective by­
law was passed at any time prior to the adjudication by the Court, 
the applicant’s rights would be lost.17
13 W illiam s v St. A ndrew s (R.M.) 61 W.W.R. 552; Z iff  v Township o f  
Bertie (1953) O.W.N. 236; R e D aw nburt & London  (1961) O.W.N. 
239; R e C ooksville  C om pany L im ited  and Y ork  (1953) O.W.N. 849; 
The issuance of the writ was stayed until the specifications were am­
ended to meet the by-law. Regina  v Gibson. Ex parte C rom iller
(1959) O.W.N. 254. See also; Parsons v St. John’s  M unicipal Coun­
cil 10 Nfld. R. 195.
14 See Regina v C ity o f E ast K ildonon, Ex parte Towns et al. K ildonan  
50 D.L.R. (2d) 381.
18 If the by-law has already been approved by the Board, m andam us can­
not be granted.
™ (1951) O.R. 489.
17 U pper Canada E states Ltd. and M acN icol (1931) O.R. 465; Toronto  
v Trustees o f the Rom an Catholic Separate Schools o f Toronto  (7926) 
A.C. 81; Bolton  v M unroe and Township o f Sandwich East (1953) O. 
W.N. 53; R e Skyw ay Drive-In Theatre L im ited  and London  (1947) O. 
W.N. 489.
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If the situation was one primarily involving a conflict be­
tween separate groups of property owners, assistance granted to 
one group as opposed to the other through the use by council of 
its legislative powers would result in bad faith being imputed to 
council. Bad faith also could be imputed if council proceeded on 
its own initiative only as a result of the particular application. If 
bad faith were present, the Court would not grant an adjournment 
to permit time for the by-law to be considered by the Board.18
As indicated in the Chapter on bad faith,10 no inquisition is 
permitted into the motives of the individual members of council. 
As stated by Spence J. in Re Granada Investments Limited and 
Toronto,20
Many individuals took sides, on the matters but it is not the con­
duct of individuals with which the court is concerned, but the 
conduct of council. It is always possible to allege that any legis­
lative body was moved too much by the noisy protest from partic­
ular persons appearing before them, but a Court should not be 
called upon to determine the wisdom of the Council’s action.
In some cases, council would pass a resolution refusing the 
permit; the object being to permit time to prepare and pass a by­
law. At this time no decision of any description had been reached, 
and no action would have been forthcoming if an application had 
not been made for a permit. If council pursued this course, the 
Court would refuse any requested adjournment on the basis that 
there was nothing for the Municipal Board to consider.21 The one 
exception was where no by-law had been passed, but council was 
proceeding diligently and in good faith with the preparation of a 
general zoning by-law. If the result of these labours was nearing
18 R e M arkham  D evelopm ents L im ited  and Scarborough [1954] O.W.N. 
81; R e C ooksville C om pany L im ited  and York  [1953] O.W.N. 849; 
R e Skyw ay Drive-In Theatres L im ited  and London  [1947] O.W.N. 
489; R e Greene and O ttaw a  [1951] O.W.N. 674; R e Beaver Lum ber 
C om pany and London  [1951] O.W.N. 23; R e Bridgman and Toronto  
[1951] O.R. 489; R e Kensington Industries Inc. and Toronto  [1955] O. 
W.N. 652; Sun Oil C om pany L td. v The Town of W hitby [1957] O. 
W.N. 362.
19 Supra pp. 173-180
20 [1955] O.W.N. 517.
21 B olton  v M unroe and Township o f Sandwich East [1953] O.W.N. 53; 
R e D aw nburt & London  [1961] O.W.N. 239; Z iff v Township of 
Bertie [1953] O.W.N. 236; R e Bala Investm ents Co. Ltd. and H am il­
ton [1969] 2 O.R. 490; The M urray Co. Ltd. v D istrict of Burnaby 
[1946] 2D.L.R. 541. It is also true that if the council is endeavouring 
to achieve some other object, no adjournment will be granted to per­
mit them to obtain approval; Roseburgh  v The Township o f N orth  
G rim sby  [1952] O.W.N. 745.
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fruition the Court would grant the required time to obtain the
Board’s approval.22
In Hammond v Hamilton,“  Roach J. A. discussing the ques­
tion of adjournment where no by-law had been enacted, said none 
should be granted:
. . .  unless the council of the municipality prior to the motion for 
m andam us coming on for hearing before the judge, has clearly 
made a decision to restrict the land against the type of building 
described in the application for the permit. . .
Under this decision, if the by-law was passed even 
after the mandamus application was commenced, it could be 
argued that the council had made a decision prior to the hearing 
and hence the application for mandamus must be dismissed. These 
remarks should not be removed from their factual context. The 
court was dealing with a situation where no by-law at all was in 
existence, and the requested adjournment was merely to enable 
one to be passed and ultimately approved by the Municipal Board.
No matter what the situation or the reasons for its request, 
the Court should be most reluctant to grant any adjournment.24 
As said by Orde J. A. in Re Upper Canada Estates Ltd. and Mac- 
Nicol:2B
The race would seem to be to the swift in these matters, and the 
goal is not reached merely when the application for the permit 
is made, or even when the proceedings for a m andam us are 
launched but only when the matter comes to be dealt with by 
the Court.
By granting the adjournment, the Court is entering the race on 
the side of the municipality. It should only be the rare and ex­
ceptional situation where the Court should intervene to terminate 
that race.
22 R e Ucci and T oronto  [1955] O.W.N. 647; Spiers v The Township of  
Toronto  [1956] O.W.N. 427; Re K err and Township o f Brock [1968]
2 O.R. 509; R e Robertson and the C ity  of Toronto  [1934] O.W.N. 
429; R e M arckty and Town o f F ort Erie [1951] O.W.N. 836; Re Lob- 
law G roceterias Co. Ltd. and Brockville  [1955] O.W.N. 258; Bondi 
v Township of Scarborough and Butler 19 D.L.R. (2d) 90; Thom pson  
v The Township o f London  [1956] O.W.N. 886; Wright and G riffey  
v Town of Burlington 17 D.L.R. (2d) 537; Re A iken and C ity  of T o­
ronto  [1943] O.W.N. 518; Re Granada Investm ents L im ited  and T o­
ronto  [1955] O.W.N. 517.
«  [1954] O.R. 209.
24 R e M etro  O il Ltd. and Toronto  [1935] O.R. 137; H am m ond  v H am ­
ilton [1954] O.R. 209.
25 [1931] O.R. 456; An appeal from this decision was dismissed with­
out reasons [1933] 2 D.L.R. 528. See also the remarks of Kings- 
tone J. in Re S. E. Lyons and Toronto  [1933] O.W.N. 330
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When the Boyd Builders Case came before the Supreme Court 
of Canada in 1965, some aspects of the law in this area were still 
unsettled. A short resumé of the factual situation in the Boyd 
Builders Case should first be indicated. Boyd, being interested in 
developing certain land as an apartment site, first obtained as­
surances that there were no by-law restrictions which would pre­
vent this type of development. The land was acquired and the 
plans prepared. On September 9, 1963 an application was filed 
for a permit.
After the filing of the application, a call to arms was issued 
by the residents of the area. On September 18 the Planning Board 
met to hear the protests of those residents, and at the conclusion 
of the hearing recommended to council that a restrictive by-law 
be passed. On the following day the council met, considered the 
recommendation, and gave all three readings to a restrictive by­
law. Boyd had no knowledge of either of these meetings. The ap­
plication for mandamus was dated September 30, 1963 and was 
issued after the Board of Control had directed the building in­
spector not to issue a permit. Schatz J., on the return date of the 
application, granted an adjournment to permit the matter to go 
before the Municipal Board. The Court of Appeal allowed the 
appeal primarily because of bad faith on the part of council.
An owner has a prim a facie right to utilize his own property in 
whatever manner he deems fit subject only to the rights of sur­
rounding owners, e.g. nuisance, etc. This prim a facie  right may 
be defeated or superseded by re-zoning if three prerequisites are 
established by the municipality, (a) a clear intent to restrict or 
zone existing before the application by the owner for a building 
permit, (b) that council has proceeded in good faith, and (c) that 
council has proceeded with dispatch.26
Mr. Justice Spence, speaking for the Court, first set out the 
common law and the manner in which those rights could be lost. 
The law as stated in this portion of the decision will effectively 
prevent a council from summarily intervening in a dispute between 
property owners. The applicant, on the other hand, must be as­
tute enough to keep his ultimate plans concealed until he is ready 
to make his building permit application.27
20 It is no doubt small consolation to the Roman Cntholic Separate 
School Board to know that if Middleton J. had applied the law on
application for m andam us brought by the Board nearly forty-five
years ago as it should have been applied, it would never have been
necessary for the Board to enter the hallowed halls of the Privy Coun­
cil, and there lose a school. Although the Separate School was not
mentioned by Spence J. the effect of his judgment will be to prevent
the recurrence of that situation.
27 A council proceeding in good faith and with dispatch with a general 
plan for the area involved will still be protected. R e Loblaw  G roce­
terias Co. Ltd. and Brockville  [1955] O.W.N. 258 is a good example; 
R e Bala Investm ents C o. Ltd. and H am ilton  [1969] 2 O.R. 490 indi­
cates that the remarks of Spence J., in this respect will be applied with 
the same clarity in which they were given.
The other aspect of the case which must be considered is that 
of good faith generally, that is, apart from the onus of proving it. 
On the general question of bad faith, a portion of the judgment 
of Roach J. A. in the Court of Appeal was adopted.
It passed that by-law for the express purpose of defeating appel­
lant’s prim a facie  right to the permit. It yielded to the protests 
of some of the other owners in the immediate neighbourhood for 
whom the Planning Board was ‘Sympathetic’. It passed that by­
law without any opportunity having been given to the appellant, 
which was so vitally interested, to make any representations con­
cerning it. Everything that was done to defeat the appellant’s 
prim a facie right was done behind its back for the obvious pur­
pose of avoiding embarrassment that the appellant’s protestation 
on its own behalf might cause. It is difficult to think of any 
stronger evidence of bad faith.
As Spence J. said in supplementing these remarks:
The relevant cases may be summerized by stating the most im­
portant indicia of good faith in these matters are frankness and 
impariality.
The clear and unequivocal implication to be drawn from 
these remarks is that if a council passes a zoning by-law affecting 
a small area of land without giving the owner an opportunity to 
be heard, bad faith will be imputed to the council. Similarly, if 
the only purpose of the by-law is to defeat an existing right, the 
same motives will be imputed. This decision will undoubtedly 
contribute to a greater respect for individual rights on the part of 
municipal councils.
The only question not adequately dealt with in this case con­
cerns the effect of an approval by the Municipal Board of the by­
law before a decision in the mandamus application. This was of 
no significance in the case as the Municipal Board had indicated 
that no further consideration would be given to the by-law pend­
ing the decision of the Court. Boyd Builders was also prepared to 
take its chances with any possible problem in this respect. Mapa 
v Township of North York,28 may be of some assistance when 
the problem arises for final determination. The ultimate question 
will be: is the decision of the Court granting a mandamus in this 
type of situation tantamount to an approval within the terms of s. 
30 (7) of The Planning Act,'M so as to confer on the owner the pro­
tection afforded to a non-conforming use?
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28 [1967] S.C.R. 172. The applicant for a building permit had re­
ceived approval for his foundation plans. A restrictive by-law pass­
ed which would restrict his development. It was held that the approval 
of the zoning and not the plans was what was intended by s. 30 (7) 
of The Planning Act.
2» R.S.O. 1960 c.296.
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The other part of the important Supreme Court duo of 1965 
is the case of Wiswell et al v Metropolitan Corporation of Great­
er Winnipeg.80 A review of the facts there shows that in 1956 Dr. 
Ginsburg obtained two orders permitting construction of a sixty- 
four unit apartment building. The granting of these orders had 
been opposed by a ratepayers association in the area, of which 
Wiswell was a member. These orders were effective for a period 
of one year and were subsequently renewed ex parte each year un­
til 1961 when all zoning matters were assumed by Metropolitan 
Winnipeg. In December of 1961 Dr. Ginsburg applied for a fur­
ther extension and a hearing on such application was held in early 
January. This application was also opposed by the ratepayers as­
sociation; however the extension was granted. Unknown to the 
ratepayers, the Doctor had applied for a re-zoning of the property 
in late December of 1961.
Under its procedural by-law the City, prior to the hearing of 
objections on any zoning by-law, must give notice. This was to be 
done by advertising in two issues of a newspaper having general 
circulation in the area and by posting notices on the property con­
cerned. The advertisement appeared in the newspaper but no no­
tice was posted on the property.
The ratepayers group was unaware of the hearing, not hav­
ing seen the notices. As a result, no one appeared to oppose the 
re-zoning by-law, which was ultimately passed. It is also signifi­
cant that the Corporation gave express notice to the solicitors for 
the Doctor and suggested they attend the hearing. No similar 
courtesy was extended to the solicitor for the ratepayers group. 
The trial judge declared the by-law bad for lack of notice. The 
Manitoba Court of Appeal reversed this decision primarily on the 
ground that the by-law was voidable and hence validated by the 
curative provisions of the statute. From the majority decision of 
that Court an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The crux of the decision is contained in the passage adopted 
by Hall and Marland J. J. from the judgment of Freedman J. A. 
in the Court of Appeal.
In proceeding to enact the by-law, Metro was essentially dealing 
with a dispute between Ginsburg who wanted the zoning require­
ments to be altered for his benefit, and those other residents who 
wanted the zoning restrictions to continue as they were. The 
Metro resolved the dispute by the device of an amending by-law 
did indeed give to its proceedings an appearance of a legislative 
character. But in truth the process in which it was engaged was 
quasi-judicial in nature.31
80 [1965] S.C.R. 512.
Ibid., at p. 520
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A great body of rules has been developed to assure that any 
judicial inquiry all parties involved will receive a fair and impartial 
hearing. These rules incompass not only the procedure involved 
but also the conduct required from those who preside. As has often 
been said, it is not only important that justice be done, it must 
also appear to be done.
If there are circumstances so affecting a person in a judicial ca­
pacity as to be calculated to create in the mind of a reasonable 
man, a suspicion of his impariality, those circumstances are suf­
ficient to disqualify him even though in fact, no bias exists, 
that it is important that there be not even a suspicion that there 
has been an improper interference with the cause of justice and 
it is sufficient that the circumstances give rise to reasonable appre­
hension.82
Of equal importance to any quasi-judicial hearing is the right 
to be heard. If people are unaware that their rights are being de­
termined, or being present are refused the right, or an adequate 
opportunity of presenting their case and refuting the material ad­
duced in opposition, it cannot be said that the tribunal has acted 
properly.83
The discretion vested in the council must be exercised judi­
cially.
A discretion does not empower a man to do what he likes 
merely because his is a mind to do so —  he must in the exer­
cise of his discretion do not what he likes, but what he ought.34
The council, after hearing submissions, is not bound to decide on 
the preponderance of evidence. It must, of course, grant a fair 
hearing to any persons appearing before it and cannot proceed on
32 Donnelly J. in R e A ston and M etropolitan Licensing Com m ission  52 
D.L.R. (2d) 403 at p. 406; See also Viscount Cave L.C. in Frame 
U nited Brewers v Bath Justices [1926] A.S. 586 at p. 590. Beer v 
Rural M unicipality o f F ort G ary  16 D.L.R. (2d) 316; The Queen 
v M illidge L .R . 4 Q.B. 322.
83 This basic principle and an example of its practical application can 
be seen in the following cases: The K ing  v London C ounty Council 
[1918] 1 K.B. 68; R e Cohen and C ity  o f Calgary 64 D.L.R. (2d) 
238; H. L o okoff v C ity  o f Vancouver 67 D.L.R. (2d) 119; Regina v 
C ity  o f Calgary Ex parte Sanderson 53 D.L.R. (2d) 447; A dvance  
G lass & M irror Co. L td . v A ttorney-G eneral o f Canada [1949]
O.W.N. 451; M elton v C ity  o f  Calgary 10 W.W.R. (N.S.) 428; It 
has also been held that a Planning Board is not generally acting in a 
judicial capacity. D obson and D obson  v C ity  o f E dm onton  19 D.L.R. 
(2d) 69. It is equally evident that in some situations the Board will 
be so acting.
34 L o rd  Sumner R oberts  v H opw ood  [1925] A.C. 578
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any predetermined course.35 It is at liberty however, to consider 
matters of policy in reaching its final decision; indeed in a zoning 
matter, it must always in the final analysis make a policy decision.
In the Wiswell Case all members of the Supreme Court were 
agreed that the City was acting judicially. There was some dis­
agreement as to whether the by-law was void or voidable. This 
was really an academic exercise, as it was concluded that the de­
termination of such a question could have no bearing on the out­
come. The offence of which the City was guilty was that of not 
giving the ratepayers notice, thereby depriving them of the right 
to be heard. As stated by Mr. Justice Hall:
It was not merely the failure to post the placards, but the mani­
fest ignoring of the fact known to it that the Association would 
oppose the by-law, and that the Association had been advised by 
letter that the orders had been extended, leaving it with no rea­
son to believe or expect that concurrent applications to re-zone 
were at the same time being processed without its knowledge.
To have held that a strict compliance with the procedural by­
law was imperative would have upset a considerable body of law.36 
If the failure to post the placards had been the only question it is 
unlikely that the plaintiffs would have been successful.
It also seems apparent from the decision that if the council 
was dealing with a large area of land, it would in all probability 
be acting legislatively.37 In this situation the formalities surround­
ing a quasi-judical hearing are not applicable, and the Court would 
not intervene.
The question which requires consideration in Ontario is that 
posed by Keith J., in Re Bala Investments Co. Ltd. and Hamil­
ton.:38
The question is: whether or not the municipal corporation with­
out in anyway advertising its intention to do so prior to an ap­
plication for a building permit being filed has the right ex post 
facto  to change the rules under which the applicant acquired his 
property without any prior notice of its intention to do so or 
even serious consideration of such an intention.
If the council in enacting a zoning by-law is acting as the 
final arbitrator in a dispute between private individuals then the 
Wiswell decision should apply. There was no provision in the en-
85 The K ing  v Port o f London A uthority  [1919] 1 K.B. 176. Reference 
can also be made to: R e Frank Brothers L td. and H am ilton Board  
of Police Com m issioners [1967] 2 O.R. 284; R e H enry’s Drive-In  
Ltd. & H am ilton Police Bd. [1960] O.W.N. 468; Some general com­
ments on the whole range of the question appear in Stoates v Bor­
ough o f Washington 44 N.J.L.R. 605.
30 See supra, Chapter 6 pp. 89-94.
87 See: M cM artin and G age v C ity  o f Vancouver 65 W.W.R. 385.
88 [1969] 2 O.R. 490, at P 495.
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abling legislation under which the by-law in the Wiswell case re­
quired notice to be given. Thus, the mere fact that no statute or 
procedural by-law requires notice to be given will not enhance 
the position of the municipality. It will be deemed to be acting in 
a quasi-judicial capacity, and as a necessary corollary to the right 
to be heard is the necessity of having notice of the hearing. What 
constitutes sufficient notice must always be a question of fact. It 
was on this point alone that Judson J. disagreed with the other 
members of the Court in the Wiswell case.
If the council proceeds with a zoning by-law for the sole pur­
pose of depriving a property owner of his right to use his property 
in a specific manner, under the Boyd Builders decision bad faith 
will be imputed to the council, and the by-law will be struck 
down. If, in resolving what is basically a dispute between property 
owners, they ignore the rights of one groups to the dispute by not 
giving notice of the intention to consider the by-law, the Wiswell 
case will apply, and the by-law will be held bad.
The real question concerns what will constitute sufficient no­
tice. Generally speaking, publication of the required notice in a 
newspaper having general circulation in the area will be sufficient. 
If, however, as in the Wiswell Case there is a past history of con­
tact between the dissident landowners and the City, a direct notice 
by letter or otherwise may be essential.
The effect of these two cases will undoubtedly be consider­
able. The position of property owners has been greatly enhanced. 
These decisions have injected into the law some of the essential 
features the omission of which, even to the casual observer, is 
blatantly obvious.
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SUMMARY
Because of the practical and significant problems which 
often arise in the initiation of an action, a review of same of 
some of these problems has been attempted, in order to ascer­
tain the real difficulties facing a person wishing to attack a by­
law. Any prospective litigant must first be apprised of the pos­
sibilities of his suit being summarily dismissed, either for lack 
of status or other technical reasons. Only having surmounted 
this not inconsiderable obstacle can the merits of the action be 
determined.
Once properly before the forum, all of the traditional 
grounds of attacking by-laws can be invoked. An attempt has 
been made to examine these rules and their applicability to zon­
ing by-laws.
To indicate more precisely the matters considered, the 
major conclusions reached will be set out in point form.
1. No discretion is vested in the Courts to dismiss an ap­
plication to quash a by-law on the grounds of laches or for the 
manner in which the illegality is proved under s. 277 of the On­
tario Municipal Act, decisions to the contrary notwithstanding.
2. S. 280 of the Ontario Municipal Act should be amended 
to permit the bringing of an application to quash at any time 
if the by-law is absolutely void.
3. Only in exceptional circumstances will a violation of a 
zoning by-law be a sufficient basis for an action for damages.
4. The traditional grounds of attacking by-laws when ex­
aimed in relation to zoning by-laws, in particular, are not al­
ways strictly applicable. This is particularly true in relation to 
such rules as those against uncertainty, discrimination and dele­
gation.
5. The recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
City of Ottaww et al v Boyd Builders Ltd. and Wiswell et cd v 
The Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg have the 
combined effect of protecting a property owner from the arbitrary 
rezoning of his land for the sole purpose of prohibiting his de­
velopment of that land, without at least affording him an oppor­
tunity to be heard before council.
